Notes / Audits and snapshots

Ethereum L1 -- maintenance run, 2026-09-19

Audits and snapshots2026-09-19Chain: EthereumLinked: Uniswap V3 Factory (Arbitrum One), Uniswap V3 Factory, Compound V3 cUSDCv3 (Comet USDC), SparkLend PoolAddressesProvider, Uniswap V4 PoolManager, Morpho Blue (singleton), Morpho Blue (singleton, Ethereum L1), WBTC (Wrapped BTC)

Source: chains/ethereum-l1/data/maintenance_2026-09-19.md in the repository, rendered here without changes. Source file

First run of the maintenance phase for this ecosystem (pipeline authority-risk-oracle-multichain-pipeline, scheduled worker). Three parts: (a) audit rotation, (b) new targets, (c) README figures check.

(a) Audit rotation -- index 0: Uniswap V3 Factory#

trackedTargets(0) on the Sepolia oracle 0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906 = 0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984, published score before this run (read on publicnode + Tenderly Sepolia, identical): admin 80 / multisig 100 / timelock 75 / oracle 100 / crossExposure 100 / composite 85.

Re-derived from scratch on Ethereum mainnet (raw eth_call, not through scorers.py), block 26012723, on 2 independent RPCs (ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com and eth.drpc.org), identical results:

Scoring those reads with the published rubric gives 80 / 100 / 75 -> composite 85 -- no divergence, no correction needed.

Partly closes the open thread in score_uniswap_v3_factory()'s docstring ("no check yet for an emergency-bypass mechanism"): no pending admin on either the Timelock or the Governor, the delay already sits at its hard-coded 2-day floor, the Governor has no whitelistGuardian, and every privileged function on the fee adapter (setFactoryOwner, setFeeSetter, fee setters, transferOwnership) is gated by the Timelock. The score was not raised because of this: the timelock cap stays at 75 until the rubric itself is reviewed (listed as an open lead, not changed by an audit pass).

Knock-on change (not a correction of an error): after this run the on-chain crossExposureScore of Uniswap V3 goes 100 -> 80, because Uniswap V4 PoolManager (added below) is owned directly by the same Timelock. Same for MakerDAO/Sky MCD_PAUSE (100 -> 80), which now shares its root with SparkLend. Composites do not change (crossExposure is not part of the composite formula).

(b) New targets (5)#

Each address has a primary source; each authority hop was read live on 2 RPCs (publicnode + gateway.tenderly.co/public/mainnet), and score_all() returned identical sub-scores on both.

UPDATED 2026-09-20: the Morpho Blue row's cross exposure of 100 (the last value of its 65/95/0/100 tuple) is the value pushed on 2026-09-19. The row says the owner Safe has the same 9 signers as the Base and Robinhood Morpho Safes, and under the project convention decided 2026-09-20 (root METHODOLOGY.md, paragraph "Convention (decided 2026-09-20)") that cross-ecosystem overlap is folded into the score: chains/ethereum-l1/scorers.py now returns 65/95/0/100/80 for it (composite 55 unchanged), and the same 9 signers also own Tempo's Morpho Blue core. Superseded by the 2026-09-20 re-push (tx 0x14b0466ab52a7bf6cab54253cda92c73d52ca1b88957632911d79136b99b7a98, Sepolia block 11740952): the oracle now holds 65/95/0/100/80/55 for this target, read back equal to the scorer output. The 100 in the row above stays as the record of the 2026-09-19 push. See "Current on-chain scores (re-push, 2026-09-20)" and the "2026-09-20 update" in deploy/README.md.

How each role/ward set was replayed (not just a single getter): Spark ACLManager RoleGranted/RoleRevoked from block 16.7M, and SparkProxy / FreezerMom / StarGuard Rely/Deny, all via the Tenderly public gateway (publicnode returns 403 on eth_getLogs, drpc returns 400 on wide ranges). Current holders on the Spark ACLManager: DEFAULT_ADMIN, POOL_ADMIN and EMERGENCY_ADMIN = SparkProxy; EMERGENCY_ADMIN + RISK_ADMIN = FreezerMom; RISK_ADMIN = KillSwitchOracle and CapAutomator (both Sourcify exact match, owner = SparkProxy).

Rubric choices made this run (stated so they can be challenged):

• 60 = 2-day delay with a known freeze/pause-only instant bypass held by an identified Safe or hat (Compound, Spark). It sits between Aave's 55 (1-day delay, same kind of bypass) and Maker's 70 / Uniswap's 75 (2 days, no bypass found).
• Morpho Blue follows the Base scorer's rule for the same protocol (65 for a threshold of 3 or more), so one protocol gets one convention across ecosystems. WBTC follows this file's Ethena convention (55: multisig over a multi-billion token with no DAO and no delay).

On-chain push (Sepolia)#

• First send 0x327864608f12ac446340f15421da4af3e7e4f496845f19de10d917e160752694 (gasPrice 0.93 gwei) stayed pending while the base fee was at 1.03 gwei. It was replaced with the same nonce (5) and the same calldata by 0xef181321e8516f14d505d473e00f96bd5d255a97bb0bae440b73eb325b39f0d8 (2.06 gwei): block 11738865, status 1, gasUsed 671736, 14 logs. The first hash no longer exists (TransactionNotFound). The push script now sends at 2x eth_gasPrice.
• trackedTargetsCount() = 14. All 14 getScore() values were read back on 2 Sepolia RPCs (publicnode + Tenderly) after the push and match score_all() exactly (lastUpdated 1789835973).
• Cost ~0.00139 ETH. Deployer balance after: ~0.01567 ETH.

Open leads (not resolved this run)#

• Lido (stETH / Dual Governance), EigenLayer (Executor multisig and Timelock), ether.fi, Rocket Pool, Curve, Pendle: high-TVL candidates, left for later because each has a multi-layer authority (Aragon ACL, dual governance, EigenLayer's 1-of-2 executor) that needs its own careful replay rather than a rushed score.
• scripts/lib/cross_ecosystem_overlap.py ETHEREUM_L1_GROUPS does not list the new Morpho Blue L1 Safe (same committee as the Base and Robinhood Safes). It is a shared repo-root file, so this worker did not edit it.
• Uniswap timelockScore cap (75): the reason for the cap ("no emergency-bypass check") is now mostly gone (see (a)). Raising it is a rubric decision, not an audit correction.

Not an audit, not investment advice. All notes · Back to the dashboard.