Uniswap V4 PoolManager · authority risk 85/100, strong

Can one person move the money in Uniswap V4 PoolManager on Ethereum? The authority score is 85 / 100 (strong): a multisig behind a long delay.

In short. PoolManager.owner() is directly the Uniswap Governance Timelock (2-day delay, answering to GovernorBravo), with no fee adapter or Safe in between. The protocolFeeController, a V4FeeAdapter, is also owned and fee-set by that same Timelock.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key80
multisig100
timelock75
price feed100
shared control80

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: keys not read, 48 h to react.

Why this score

PoolManager.owner() is directly the Uniswap Governance Timelock (2-day delay, answering to GovernorBravo), with no fee adapter or Safe in between. The protocolFeeController, a V4FeeAdapter, is also owned and fee-set by that same Timelock.

cross-exposure: 80, same Timelock as V3 Factory

Same root and same scoring as the V3 Factory (admin 80, timelock 75, composite 85), so both sit behind one Timelock, which is why crossExposureScore is 80. The V4FeePolicy’s owner and feeSetter are also that Timelock.

5 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 68.75% (score 85). Already in the top band.

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Uniswap V4 PoolManager](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fethereum-l1-sepolia%2F0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).

Money behind it: $767M (DefiLlama), of which $115M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 48 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 172800s delay 0x1a9c8182…35bc via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. This holder also governs 2 other tracked contracts (about $818M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x8366a39c… on Robinhood Chain, 0x00000000… on Robinhood Chain. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (2 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# delay() on the holder (Compound-style timelock), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x1a9c8182c09f50c8318d769245bea52c32be35bc","data":"0x6a42b8f8"},"latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 11922317, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000000000000004444c5dc75cb358380d2e3de08a90"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (85 = 0x55); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.