Can one person move the money in SparkLend PoolAddressesProvider on Ethereum? The authority score is 78 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. PoolAddressesProvider.owner() is SparkProxy, whose three wards are Sky’s MCD_PAUSE_PROXY (behind the same 2-day-delay governance already scored for MCD_PAUSE), an ESM whose threshold is set to the uint256 maximum so it cannot fire, and StarGuard, itself warded only by MCD_PAUSE_PROXY. A separate FreezerMom can freeze or pause markets with no delay, through the Sky Chief’s current hat or a 3-of-5 Safe.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 75 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 60 |
| price feed | 20 |
| shared control | 40 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
PoolAddressesProvider.owner() is SparkProxy, whose three wards are Sky’s MCD_PAUSE_PROXY (behind the same 2-day-delay governance already scored for MCD_PAUSE), an ESM whose threshold is set to the uint256 maximum so it cannot fire, and StarGuard, itself warded only by MCD_PAUSE_PROXY. A separate FreezerMom can freeze or pause markets with no delay, through the Sky Chief’s current hat or a 3-of-5 Safe.
cross-exposure: 80, same Sky root as MCD_PAUSE
The instant seat can only freeze or pause markets, an availability risk rather than fund redirection, and it is why timelockScore is 60 instead of MCD_PAUSE’s 70. Two other RISK_ADMIN holders (KillSwitchOracle and CapAutomator) are automated contracts administered by SparkProxy, disclosed but not scored.
Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths not all checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 63.50% (score 78). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 75 to 79, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Bypass paths of the delay checked and ruled out (the waiting time may be skipped).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x02c3ea4e34c0cbd694d2adfa2c690eecbc1793ee.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $5.2B (DefiLlama), of which $1.1B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x02c3ea4e34c0cbd694d2adfa2c690eecbc1793ee on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x02c3ea4e34c0cbd694d2adfa2c690eecbc1793ee) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x3300f198…f8c4 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x02c3ea4e34c0cbd694d2adfa2c690eecbc1793ee","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000002c3ea4e34c0cbd694d2adfa2c690eecbc1793ee"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (78 = 0x4e); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.