Morpho Blue (singleton) · authority risk 55/100, moderate

Can one person move the money in Morpho Blue (singleton) on Base? The authority score is 55 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.

In short. owner() resolves to a real Gnosis Safe in one hop, fully closed - but by Morpho’s own immutable-core design, owner() can only set fees and enable new markets, never touch funds in existing markets directly.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key65
multisig95
timelock0
price feed100
shared control80

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: 5 keys, 0 h to react, about $889M behind one key.

Why this score

owner() resolves to a real Gnosis Safe in one hop, fully closed - but by Morpho’s own immutable-core design, owner() can only set fees and enable new markets, never touch funds in existing markets directly.

$3.90B TVL - largest target in this expansion

Scored on the authority root mechanism itself (a Safe, same convention as every other Safe-rooted target in this project), not on the narrower operational blast radius - consistent with how Aerodrome’s pauser Safe below is also scored on the mechanism rather than its scope.

3 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 55 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 78, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Morpho Blue (singleton)](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fbase-sepolia%2F0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/base-0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Money behind it: $4.4B (DefiLlama), of which $2.0B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb) on the Base oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 48160953, methodology 0x0ffe08e65a4a36a2…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0xcba2…9afa has executed 16 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.

Read live: admin: Safe 5-of-9 of 9 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 5-of-9 0xcba2…9af…9afa via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $889M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 5 keys collude to act; 5 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 9 plain keys. This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $9.5B behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0xbbbbbbbb… on Ethereum. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (5 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x32362db"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://mainnet.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 52650708 and 52650715 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 48160953, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia.base.org -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000bbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb"},"0x2dee0b9"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (55 = 0x37); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.