Can one person move the money in WBTC (Wrapped BTC) on Ethereum? The authority score is 52 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. WBTC.owner() is the WBTC Controller, whose owner is a legacy Gnosis MultiSigWallet (6-of-10, not a Safe) with no timelock. That multisig can replace the Factory (the only address the Controller lets mint or burn), replace the Members registry, pause or unpause the token and start a transfer of the token’s own ownership.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
WBTC.owner() is the WBTC Controller, whose owner is a legacy Gnosis MultiSigWallet (6-of-10, not a Safe) with no timelock. That multisig can replace the Factory (the only address the Controller lets mint or burn), replace the Members registry, pause or unpause the token and start a transfer of the token’s own ownership.
$9.50B TVL, no delay
Only 4 transactions have ever been submitted through the wallet (3 executed, each in the block of its sixth confirmation, so no delay in practice) and its dailyLimit is 0; three of its ten signers are themselves contracts. Scored like Ethena’s minting contract (admin 55: a multisig over a multi-billion token with no delay). The BTC backing sits with off-chain custodians, outside this oracle’s on-chain scope.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 52 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 55 to 74, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x2260fac5e5542a773aa44fbcfedf7c193bc2c599.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $9.6B (DefiLlama, all chains), of which $4.6B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x2260fac5e5542a773aa44fbcfedf7c193bc2c599 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x2260fac5e5542a773aa44fbcfedf7c193bc2c599) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0xca06411b…beb7 via owner() -> owner() of the holder (contract), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is another contract 0x972eed35781f09987a5c40f761f6a24623c570de: that is the hand. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x2260fac5e5542a773aa44fbcfedf7c193bc2c599","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000002260fac5e5542a773aa44fbcfedf7c193bc2c599"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (52 = 0x34); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.