Can one person move the money in Morpho Blue (singleton, Ethereum L1) on Ethereum? The authority score is 56 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. owner() is a 5-of-9 Gnosis Safe reached in one hop (all nine signers are plain EOAs), with no Timelock and no delay. Its owner-only powers are setOwner, enableIrm, enableLltv, setFee (capped at 25%) and setFeeRecipient, so by Morpho’s immutable-core design it cannot withdraw funds from existing markets.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 6 keys, 0 h to react, about $839M behind one key.
owner() is a 5-of-9 Gnosis Safe reached in one hop (all nine signers are plain EOAs), with no Timelock and no delay. Its owner-only powers are setOwner, enableIrm, enableLltv, setFee (capped at 25%) and setFeeRecipient, so by Morpho’s immutable-core design it cannot withdraw funds from existing markets.
cross-exposure: 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20), same 9 signers as the Base, Robinhood and Tempo Morpho Safes
The owner Safe’s 9 signers are identical, at the same 5-of-9 threshold, to the Morpho Blue owner Safes on Base, Robinhood Chain and Tempo, so one committee gates all four deployments. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20: that cross-ecosystem overlap is folded into crossExposureScore as a flat 80, where the within-Ethereum-L1 comparison alone would leave it at 100; composite is unchanged. The scorer compares the freshly read owner set against a dated snapshot of the committee and opens no second RPC connection. Scored with the same rule as the Base card (admin 65 for a threshold of 3 or more, timelock 0), so one protocol keeps one convention across ecosystems.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 56 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 74, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: shared control: the score says no key is shared, but this contract's own independent read lists another tracked contract with the same admin (unresolved, 12/10: do not read "no key shared" as established).
Money behind it: $5.0B (DefiLlama), of which $2.2B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0xcba2…9afa has executed 282 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 6-of-10 of 9 plain keys, 1 Safe; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 6-of-10 0xcba2…9af…9afa via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 6 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $839M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 6 keys collude to act; 5 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 9 plain keys, 1 Safe. This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $9.5B behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0xbbbbbbbb… on Base. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xbbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000bbbbbbbbbb9cc5e90e3b3af64bdaf62c37eeffcb"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (56 = 0x38); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.