Every six hours the watch signs a list of the sha256 of every file it publishes, of its own code, the commit it ran from, and the head of a hash-chained event log. The run is committed. Nothing on this page asks to be trusted: each line has a command that replays it.
| Last signed run | 2026-10-15T19:14:42Z |
|---|---|
| Files hashed in that run | 1022 |
| Code files hashed | 94 |
| Repository commit signed over | 2b1f0b808c86 |
| Head of the event-log chain | 7b50c8dc640f54b86b1ea3f07f4fe1978d24f38f713d337a7a023afa48a1b8d2 |
| Signing key (Ed25519, public) | 11baca3ef6a69de4901c185f6cbbd3f93318fbb74f9961a8d39aead841adf409 |
| On-chain pushes, first to last | 2026-09-23 16:16 UTC to 2026-10-13 03:26 UTC |
git clone https://github.com/RealSpap/authority-risk-oracle-showcase cd authority-risk-oracle-showcase pip install pynacl python3 scripts/audit_public.py # downloads the published run, checks hashes, chain and signature python3 scripts/audit_public.py --ref COMMIT # the same for any past run: every run is a commit python3 scripts/verify_chain.py --events watch/events.jsonl # every line of the log commits to the previous one python3 scripts/sign_run.py --watch watch --verify # the Ed25519 signature of the manifest
Without pynacl the audit ends with exit code 3 and says it is incomplete: it never reports a pass it did not check. Compare the signing key above with the one pinned in the dashboard: a signature only proves the files match what that key signed.
A date we write ourselves proves nothing. Three things carry a date we do not control: the block timestamp of every score pushed to an oracle (read it with getScore; each contract page has the exact call under "Reproduce this read yourself"), the transaction that anchors a commitment on Zcash testnet (listed in the deployed oracles table), and the contracts' own creation on their explorers.
Not an audit, not investment advice. Back to the dashboard.