Can one person move the money in Save (ex Solend) lending program on Solana? The authority score is 2 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. The lending program's upgrade authority is a single on-curve key with no multisig wrapper: one signature can replace its code, with no delay. That is the bottom rung of the scale.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 5 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react, about $86M behind one key.
The lending program's upgrade authority is a single on-curve key with no multisig wrapper: one signature can replace its code, with no delay. That is the bottom rung of the scale.
bare key, bottom rung
Live-verified on 2026-09-17 and re-checked on 2026-09-20. The key was rotated on 2026-04-04 by direct signatures between two on-curve keys, so it is live and used; the program was last upgraded on 2025-07-02. The lending market owner was not decoded and cannot lower a bare-key score. This is a different target from Solend DAO governance above. DefiLlama listed over $50M TVL on 2026-09-17.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 2 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 5 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-So1endDq2YkqhipRh3WViPa8hdiSpxWy6z3Z6tMCpAo.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $86M (DefiLlama), of which $84M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: So1endDq2YkqhipRh3WViPa8hdiSpxWy6z3Z6tMCpAo on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account CjxzGp…D6xH on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a plain key; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a plain key (bare EOA) RY93CZ…mJf…mJfh via program -> ProgramData DMCvGv… -> upgrade authority (on the curve: a plain key), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, no delay to react, $86M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). Program last deployed at slot 350614570 on 2025-07-02 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: a repository is registered, https://github.com/solendprotocol/solana-program-library). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).