Can one person move the money in marginfi main lending group on Solana? The authority score is 33 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.
In short. Upgrades need 7 of 15 signers and group admin actions only 5 of 17, both with no delay, and the upgrade voters are a subset of the admin group. The score is still an upper bound.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 45 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 50 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 7 keys, 0 h to react, about $5M behind one key.
Upgrades need 7 of 15 signers and group admin actions only 5 of 17, both with no delay, and the upgrade voters are a subset of the admin group. The score is still an upper bound.
upper bound: 7 more admin fields not decoded
Program upgrade is a Squads v4 multisig, 7-of-15, all 15 can vote, no delay. MarginfiGroup.admin is a different Squads v4 multisig, 5-of-17 (15 listed members can vote), also no delay. All 15 upgrade voters sit inside the admin multisig, so this is one governing body under a lower bar, not two independent checks. The on-chain IDL lists seven more admin-named fields on the group (emode_admin, risk_admin and five others) that were not decoded, and each could only lower the score. Oracle authority is not scored for this target (a flat 100 in code).
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 33 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 45 to 62, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-4qp6Fx6tnZkY5Wropq9wUYgtFxXKwE6viZxFHg3rdAG8.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $37M (DefiLlama), of which $25M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: 4qp6Fx6tnZkY5Wropq9wUYgtFxXKwE6viZxFHg3rdAG8 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account DwFJ63…Euxk on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 7-of-15 of 15 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 7-of-15 J3oBkTkDXU…FD47 via account owned by program MFv2hWf3… -> program -> ProgramData 4Q8u2n… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig 7FCPipJWVbPbdHymVt1gJYwKciakkJz5GahdQySemvHk, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 15 of 15 members can vote (15 can initiate, 15 can execute). 2 former member entries left in the account after removals. The attacker's question: 7 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $5M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 7 keys collude to act; 9 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 15 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 456093551 on 2026-10-12 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). Verified build (OtterSec): a build from https://github.com/mrgnlabs/marginfi-v2/tree/c5d440f62365de503c89cf6ec39fb6673494cc7c matches the deployed binary, last matched 2026-10-14. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).