Fluid (Instadapp) Liquidity · authority risk 59/100, moderate

Can one person move the money in Fluid (Instadapp) Liquidity on Plasma? The authority score is 59 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.

In short. A self-administered TimelockController with a real, confirmed 24-hour delay controls both governance and proxy upgrades on one shared storage slot. Its proposer is an Avocado multisig (6 of 12 signers) and its executor a 3-of-5 Safe, the same committee as Fluid on Arbitrum One.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key65
multisig55
timelock55
price feed52
shared control80

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: keys not read, 24 h to react.

Why this score

A self-administered TimelockController with a real, confirmed 24-hour delay controls both governance and proxy upgrades on one shared storage slot. Its proposer is an Avocado multisig (6 of 12 signers) and its executor a 3-of-5 Safe, the same committee as Fluid on Arbitrum One.

67 to 59, cross-exposure 100 to 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20, Plasma testnet block 34100595)

owner() reverts by design (a custom "infinite proxy", not Ownable): the real admin getter is getAdmin(), independently re-derived via keccak256 rather than copied from docs. The proposer answers requiredSigners() = 6 and signers() = 12 (an Avocado multisig, not a Safe: the first pass tried only the Safe interface), the executor is a Safe v1.4.1, 3-of-5, and both read identically on Arbitrum One. Four of the five executor owners are also among the twelve signers. Four active Liquidity auths (config-handler contracts whose TEAM_MULTISIG() is the same multisig) and the guardian act without the delay, so timelockScore is capped at 55. The oracle was rewritten with these values on 2026-09-20 (the earlier 40 / 100 / 70, composite 67, is superseded).

2 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: a delay with a bounded bypass, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 59 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): timelock from 55 to 57, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Fluid (Instadapp) Liquidity](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fplasma%2F0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/plasma-0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).

Money behind it: $35M (DefiLlama), of which $14M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497) on the Plasma oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 36260964, methodology 0x026c7c3b27bb926e…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 24 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 86400s delay 0x4d6ce4f4…2346 via EIP-1967 admin, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Implementation behind the proxy: 0x3605004f3f40e7147300574e786206de8b342796 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). No verified source on Sourcify for the code behind this proxy (this watch asks Sourcify only; an explorer of the chain may hold one). This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $170M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x52aa8994… on Arbitrum. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (3 public RPC calls, no key)
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","0x21856af"]}'
# getMinDelay() on the holder (OpenZeppelin TimelockController), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x4d6ce4f4498d59eed397bcbc687805a07f9b2346","data":"0xf27a0c92"},"latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 35149475 and 35149487 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 36260964, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000052aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497"},"0x2294c64"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (59 = 0x3b); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.