Can one person move the money in Fluid Liquidity (Arbitrum) on Arbitrum? The authority score is 59 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Upgrade/governance admin is a self-administered TimelockController (24h). Proposer = Fluid’s 6-of-12 Avocado multisig, executor = a 3-of-5 Safe.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 55 |
| timelock | 55 |
| price feed | 20 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys not read, 24 h to react.
Upgrade/governance admin is a self-administered TimelockController (24h). Proposer = Fluid’s 6-of-12 Avocado multisig, executor = a 3-of-5 Safe.
cross-exposure: 80 - same 6-of-12 as Plasma
Resolves the signer set Plasma’s sibling scorer left open. Bounded config handlers and the guardian (same Avocado multisig) act without the delay, so timelock is capped at 55.
Exit window: a delay with a bounded bypass, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 59 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): timelock from 55 to 57, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/arbitrum-0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $135M (DefiLlama), of which $55M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497) on the Arbitrum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 319507783, methodology 0x51163f3cce461201…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 24 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 86400s delay 0x4d6ce4f4…2346 via EIP-1967 admin, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Implementation behind the proxy: 0xa57d7cef617271f4cea4f665d33ebcfcba4929f6 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). Its source is verified on Sourcify (FluidLiquidityDummyImpl, exact match, 0.8.21+commit.d9974bed). This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $170M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x52aa8994… on Plasma. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","latest"]}'
# getMinDelay() on the holder (OpenZeppelin TimelockController), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x4d6ce4f4498d59eed397bcbc687805a07f9b2346","data":"0xf27a0c92"},"latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://arb1.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x52aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 515148086 and 515148107 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://sepolia-rollup.arbitrum.io/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000052aa899454998be5b000ad077a46bbe360f4e497"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (59 = 0x3b); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.