Can one person move the money in Morpho Vault: Grove x Steakhouse High Yield AUSD on Monad? The authority score is 67 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. The largest Morpho vault on Monad (~$108K TVL, a very early deployment). curator() and guardian() resolve to the identical 2-of-6 Safe - no independent veto party during the vault’s own 14-day cap-change timelock.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 70 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 75 |
| timelock | 55 |
| price feed | 20 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 5 keys, 336 h to react, about $21k behind one key.
The largest Morpho vault on Monad (~$108K TVL, a very early deployment). curator() and guardian() resolve to the identical 2-of-6 Safe - no independent veto party during the vault’s own 14-day cap-change timelock.
composite 60 - curator = guardian
A real 14-day timelock exists on per-market cap changes, but because the proposing party (curator) and the vetoing party (guardian) are the same multisig, the delay’s independent-check purpose doesn’t hold in practice. The separate 5-of-8 owner Safe governs meta-parameters (curator appointment, fees).
Exit window: a delay with a bounded bypass, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 55.25% (score 67). Cheapest path to strong (80): timelock from 55 to 97, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/monad-0x32841a8511d5c2c5b253f45668780b99139e476d.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: shared control: the score says no key is shared, but this contract's own independent read lists another tracked contract with the same admin (unresolved, 12/10: do not read "no key shared" as established).
Money behind it: $29M (DefiLlama), of which $9M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x32841a8511d5c2c5b253f45668780b99139e476d on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x32841a8511d5c2c5b253f45668780b99139e476d) on the Monad oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 71327646, methodology 0x4988d9ca0f320921…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Other hands: guardian() is a Safe 3-of-9 (0x827e…ecdb); curator() is a Safe 3-of-9 (0x827e…ecdb). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x0a0e…f8dd has executed 15 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 5-of-10 of 10 plain keys; delay: 336 h the contract enforces itself.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 5-of-10 0x0a0e…f8d…f8dd via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, 336 h to react, $21k behind each key ($106k of AUSD held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). The contract enforces its own timelock of 336 h (timelock()). 5 keys collude to act; 6 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 10 plain keys. This holder also governs 4 other tracked contracts (about $29M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0xbeef010f… on Base, 0xbeef2d50… on Base, 0xbeef047a… on Ethereum, 0xbeef0173… on Ethereum. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x32841a8511d5c2c5b253f45668780b99139e476d","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x6c6c938"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.monad.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 113690920 and 113690936 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.monad.xyz/ -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000032841a8511d5c2c5b253f45668780b99139e476d"},"0x4405f9e"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (67 = 0x43); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.