Steakhouse USDC (steakUSDC) · authority risk 73/100, decent

Can one person move the money in Steakhouse USDC (steakUSDC) on Ethereum? The authority score is 73 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key70
multisig75
timelock75
price feed52
shared control40

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: 5 keys, 168 h to react, about $13M behind one key.

4 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 59.75% (score 73). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 70 to 87, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Price feed not under one hand (one party controls the price).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Steakhouse USDC (steakUSDC)](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fethereum-l1-sepolia%2F0xbeef01735c132ada46aa9aa4c54623caa92a64cb.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0xbeef01735c132ada46aa9aa4c54623caa92a64cb.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Money behind it: $67M (DefiLlama), of which $18M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0xbeef01735c132ada46aa9aa4c54623caa92a64cb on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xbeef01735c132ada46aa9aa4c54623caa92a64cb) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Other hands: guardian() is a contract (0xaa0500198b4425dfc4e272fbe42c8e64e21fc03d); curator() is a Safe 3-of-9 (0x827e…ecdb). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.

Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x0a0e…f8dd has executed 139 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.

Read live: admin: Safe 5-of-10 of 10 plain keys; delay: 168 h the contract enforces itself.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 5-of-10 0x0a0e…f8d…f8dd via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, 168 h to react, $13M behind each key ($67M of USDC held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). The contract enforces its own timelock of 168 h (timelock()). 5 keys collude to act; 6 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 10 plain keys. This holder also governs 4 other tracked contracts (about $29M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0xbeef010f… on Base, 0xbeef2d50… on Base, 0xbeef047a… on Ethereum, 0x32841a85… on Monad. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score over time (3 points, 2026-10-10 to 2026-10-13, from the chained log): 2026-10-10: 672026-10-10: 732026-10-13: 73 67 to 73 to 73 Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (5 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xbeef01735c132ada46aa9aa4c54623caa92a64cb","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 11922317, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000beef01735c132ada46aa9aa4c54623caa92a64cb"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (73 = 0x49); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.