Can one person move the money in USDtb PSM (peg-stability module) on Ethereum? The authority score is 73 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. A real 24h Timelock + 5-of-10 Safe govern this - but 3 freeze-type functions are instantly bypassable by a single role holder. The fund-redirect functions are not.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 55 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 20 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys not read, 24 h to react.
A real 24h Timelock + 5-of-10 Safe govern this - but 3 freeze-type functions are instantly bypassable by a single role holder. The fund-redirect functions are not.
nuanced: freeze bypass, funds protected
disableSwap/disableCollateral/disableBenefactor are all whitelisted for an instant bypass of the 24h delay (a DoS/availability risk). setAssetSendCustodian/setAssetReceiveCustodian - the calls that would actually redirect PSM funds - are confirmed NOT whitelisted, still requiring the full delay. setPegPrice is gated to the Timelock alone, migrated off the Safe on 2026-07-30.
Exit window: a delay with a bounded bypass, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 59.75% (score 73). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 65 to 83, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x73e35c5c35a274e34ade6eb13cc7f62aee323728.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $476M (DefiLlama), of which $128M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x73e35c5c35a274e34ade6eb13cc7f62aee323728 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x73e35c5c35a274e34ade6eb13cc7f62aee323728) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 24 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 86400s delay 0xe8dc0fab…7c94 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. This holder also governs 4 other tracked contracts (about $5.2B behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x5d3a1ff2… on Ethereum, 0x211cc4dd… on Ethereum, 0x58538e6a… on Ethereum, 0xe3490297… on Ethereum. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x73e35c5c35a274e34ade6eb13cc7f62aee323728","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# getMinDelay() on the holder (OpenZeppelin TimelockController), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xe8dc0fab349ea169283c48ccfd09d797e6db7c94","data":"0xf27a0c92"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000073e35c5c35a274e34ade6eb13cc7f62aee323728"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (73 = 0x49); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.