Can one person move the money in Ethena LayerZero OFTAdapters on Ethereum? The authority score is 57 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Same EthenaTimelockController as the PSM above governs all three cross-chain bridges - but here the bypassable function is setPeer(), which redirects the trusted remote counterpart.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 15 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 20 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys not read, 24 h to react.
Same EthenaTimelockController as the PSM above governs all three cross-chain bridges - but here the bypassable function is setPeer(), which redirects the trusted remote counterpart.
more severe than the PSM’s gap
setPeer(uint32,bytes32) is confirmed whitelisted (instant bypass) on all three adapters - a compromised executor could point a peer at a malicious remote contract and mint/redeem against a fake bridge, not merely freeze activity. setDelegate() is confirmed genuinely delayed. USDe alone backs $5.14B on Ethereum; these adapters are the real cross-chain path for that value, not a side contract. This is exactly the risk class the KelpDAO $292M exploit (see the incident panel above) realized in production on a different protocol’s bridge.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 57 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 55 to 63, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/ethereum-l1-0x58538e6a46e07434d7e7375bc268d3cb839c0133.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $4.7B (DefiLlama), of which $2.0B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x58538e6a46e07434d7e7375bc268d3cb839c0133 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x58538e6a46e07434d7e7375bc268d3cb839c0133) on the Ethereum oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 11922317, methodology 0x46a1a85b619e7db0…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 24 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 86400s delay 0xe8dc0fab…7c94 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. This holder also governs 4 other tracked contracts (about $5.2B behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x73e35c5c… on Ethereum, 0x5d3a1ff2… on Ethereum, 0x211cc4dd… on Ethereum, 0xe3490297… on Ethereum. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x58538e6a46e07434d7e7375bc268d3cb839c0133","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"latest"]}'
# getMinDelay() on the holder (OpenZeppelin TimelockController), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xe8dc0fab349ea169283c48ccfd09d797e6db7c94","data":"0xf27a0c92"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 26199869 and 26199870 of the chain; this RPC cannot replay the block of the read (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state): the answers are the current ones
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://ethereum-sepolia-rpc.publicnode.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xB6F8474ccC71AF477c31c2DF663B3942ddfbf906","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000058538e6a46e07434d7e7375bc268d3cb839c0133"},"0xb5eb8d"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (57 = 0x39); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.