Tempo L1 validator registry (ValidatorConfigV2) · authority risk 31/100, weak

Can one person move the money in Tempo L1 validator registry (ValidatorConfigV2) on Tempo? The authority score is 31 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.

In short. The chain-level baseline every other target on Tempo inherits. A real 2-of-5 Safe, no timelock - any 2 of the 5 signers can change validator config immediately.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key50
multisig37
timelock0
price feed100
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: 2 keys, 0 h to react, about $53M behind one key.

Why this score

The chain-level baseline every other target on Tempo inherits. A real 2-of-5 Safe, no timelock - any 2 of the 5 signers can change validator config immediately.

every target below inherits this

Tempo has no native gas token: every account on this chain, this oracle’s own deploy key included, pays fees in a TIP-20 stablecoin (pathUSD) rather than ETH - a real structural difference from every other chain this project tracks, not just a labeling quirk.

3 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 31 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 50 to 71, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is At least a 3-of-5 multisig (too few people need to agree).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Tempo L1 validator registry (ValidatorCo](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Ftempo-moderato%2F0xcccccccc00000000000000000000000000000001.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/tempo-0xcccccccc00000000000000000000000000000001.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Money behind it: $107M (DefiLlama, the whole chain), of which $74M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0xcccccccc00000000000000000000000000000001 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xcccccccc00000000000000000000000000000001) on the Tempo oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 39731343, methodology 0x0a3df5ccf0492a80…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0xdc65…ca33 has executed 33 transactions (last seen moving on 2026-10-13). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.

Read live: admin: Safe 2-of-5 of 5 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 2-of-5 0xdc659eff…ca33 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 2 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $53M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 2 keys collude to act; 4 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 5 plain keys. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (5 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xcccccccc00000000000000000000000000000001","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x2a3faf7"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xdc659eff2784cf79fba88f85d26b1392270cca33","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xdc659eff2784cf79fba88f85d26b1392270cca33","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xdc659eff2784cf79fba88f85d26b1392270cca33","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0xdc659eff2784cf79fba88f85d26b1392270cca33","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 44301033 and 44301047 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 39731343, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.moderato.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000cccccccc00000000000000000000000000000001"},"0x25e408f"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (31 = 0x1f); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.