Can one person move the money in Sentora pathUSD (Morpho Vault V2) on Tempo? The authority score is 27 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 10 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 15 |
| timelock | 60 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react, about $28M behind one key.
Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths not all checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 27 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 10 to 43, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/tempo-0x9a044ae05e5e6290dcf56afd69548565e957a626.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $65M (DefiLlama), of which $48M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x9a044ae05e5e6290dcf56afd69548565e957a626 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x9a044ae05e5e6290dcf56afd69548565e957a626) on the Tempo oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 39731343, methodology 0x0a3df5ccf0492a80…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Other hands: curator() is a Safe 1-of-1 (0x9e396de3312d373b87f9bd8763fb48184b42aac0). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0xe8c9…8008 has executed 3 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 1-of-1 of 1 plain key; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 1-of-1, whose owners are eoa 0xe8c9c99e…8008 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, no delay to react, $28M behind each key ($28M of pathUSD held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). 1 key collude to act; 1 key lost and nobody can act (one lost key freezes this Safe). Signers: 1 plain key. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9a044ae05e5e6290dcf56afd69548565e957a626","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x2a3faf7"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xe8c9c99ecad0686a14a00d8521c572281e938008","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xe8c9c99ecad0686a14a00d8521c572281e938008","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xe8c9c99ecad0686a14a00d8521c572281e938008","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0xe8c9c99ecad0686a14a00d8521c572281e938008","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 44301033 and 44301047 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.moderato.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000009a044ae05e5e6290dcf56afd69548565e957a626"},"0x25e408f"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (27 = 0x1b); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.