Unnamed pathUSD Vault V2 feeding Sentora · authority risk 9/100, critical

Can one person move the money in Unnamed pathUSD Vault V2 feeding Sentora on Tempo? The authority score is 9 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.

In short. owner and curator are the same single EOA - the weakest Vault V2 shape this project tracks anywhere: one key holds both roles a Vault V2 is designed to separate.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key10
multisig15
timelock0
price feed100
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react, about $213k behind one key.

Why this score

owner and curator are the same single EOA - the weakest Vault V2 shape this project tracks anywhere: one key holds both roles a Vault V2 is designed to separate.

composite 9 - owner = curator = one EOA

Feeds directly into the Sentora pathUSD vault above (idx 10) - a weakly-governed vault sitting one hop upstream doesn’t insulate depositors in the downstream vault from this vault’s own risk.

2 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 9 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 10 to 38, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Unnamed pathUSD Vault V2 feeding Sentora](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Ftempo-moderato%2F0x83a1491f3e7f8daab8f787a631334b9ca7a87023.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/tempo-0x83a1491f3e7f8daab8f787a631334b9ca7a87023.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Money behind it: $213k (DefiLlama), of which $193k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0x83a1491f3e7f8daab8f787a631334b9ca7a87023 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x83a1491f3e7f8daab8f787a631334b9ca7a87023) on the Tempo oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 39731343, methodology 0x0a3df5ccf0492a80…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Other hands: curator() is a plain key (0x445f…8dc9). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.

Read live: admin: a plain key, 0 transactions sent; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a plain key (bare EOA) 0x445f…8dc…8dc9 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. This key has sent 0 transactions (it never acted from this address). The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, no delay to react, $213k behind each key ($213k of pathUSD held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (3 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x83a1491f3e7f8daab8f787a631334b9ca7a87023","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x2a3faf7"]}'
# eth_getCode on the holder: 0x means a plain key
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["<holder>","latest"]}'
# eth_getTransactionCount on the holder: how many transactions this key has sent (0 at the read)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionCount","params":["<holder>","0x2a3faf7"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 44301033 and 44301047 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 39731343, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.moderato.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000083a1491f3e7f8daab8f787a631334b9ca7a87023"},"0x25e408f"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (9 = 0x9); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.