Can one person move the money in Morpho Blue core on Tempo? The authority score is 55 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Owned by a 5-of-9 Safe (nine plain EOA signers, no module, no guard) with no timelock, so any 5 signers can act immediately. The owner’s powers are limited to transferring ownership, enabling new rate models and LLTVs, and setting per-market fees (capped at 25% of interest) and the fee recipient, with no function to move user funds, pause the contract, or change an existing market’s oracle, rate model or LLTV.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 96 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 5 keys, 0 h to react, about $13M behind one key.
Owned by a 5-of-9 Safe (nine plain EOA signers, no module, no guard) with no timelock, so any 5 signers can act immediately. The owner’s powers are limited to transferring ownership, enabling new rate models and LLTVs, and setting per-market fees (capped at 25% of interest) and the fee recipient, with no function to move user funds, pause the contract, or change an existing market’s oracle, rate model or LLTV.
$42.6M TVL, no timelock, cross-exposure: 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20)
The oracle score of 100 means not applicable, not safe: this owner has no power over any market’s price source, but per-market oracle authority is a separate target shape not yet scored. Within Tempo no signer is shared with another tracked target, but the same 9 signers at the same 5-of-9 threshold also control the Morpho Blue owner Safe on Ethereum, Base and Robinhood Chain. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20: that cross-ecosystem overlap is folded into crossExposureScore as a flat 80 (composite unchanged). The Safe address differs from Ethereum’s, so the scorer’s dated snapshot holds the owner set, not an address, and records the finding in the target’s notes (crossChainSignerOverlap). The core is immutable (no proxy) and no protocol fee is active today (feeRecipient reads the zero address and every market reads a fee of 0).
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 55 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 77, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/tempo-0x10ee9aac980a180dd4dcfc96c746d60b0ea88f97.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $66M (DefiLlama), of which $30M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x10ee9aac980a180dd4dcfc96c746d60b0ea88f97 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x10ee9aac980a180dd4dcfc96c746d60b0ea88f97) on the Tempo oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 39731343, methodology 0x0a3df5ccf0492a80…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x6458…fbbc has never executed a transaction (nonce 0): this admin path has not been exercised on-chain. A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 5-of-9 of 9 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 5-of-9 0x6458…fbb…fbbc via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $13M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 5 keys collude to act; 5 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 9 plain keys. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x10ee9aac980a180dd4dcfc96c746d60b0ea88f97","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x2a3faf7"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 44301033 and 44301047 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.moderato.tempo.xyz -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000010ee9aac980a180dd4dcfc96c746d60b0ea88f97"},"0x25e408f"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (55 = 0x37); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.