Can one person move the money in Drift Protocol on Solana? The authority score is 48 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. In April 2026 a 2-of-5 multisig with no delay, which held Drift's admin key, was used to reassign it to an attacker (press reports $285M drained). The upgrade multisig is now 4-of-7 with a 1-hour delay, still short of strong.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 70 |
| timelock | 2 |
| price feed | 2 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 4 keys, 1 h to react, about $161k behind one key.
In April 2026 a 2-of-5 multisig with no delay, which held Drift's admin key, was used to reassign it to an attacker (press reports $285M drained). The upgrade multisig is now 4-of-7 with a 1-hour delay, still short of strong.
retroactive backtest of the 2026-04-01 exploit
The repo verified on chain the two transactions on 2026-04-01 that used the old multisig to reassign Drift's admin key. The roughly 31 withdrawals were not re-derived. That multisig also had a non-default config_authority, not traced further. Retroactive score of that setup: 32. Now the upgrade multisig is 4-of-7 (6 can vote), 1-hour delay, autonomous. The DAO realm authority is self-governed: token vote with a 2% yes threshold, 1-day hold-up, 4-day voting, plus a 5-seat council that can only veto. The oracle sub-score rests on one Switchboard-fed market (AI16Z), not every market.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 48 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 95, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-dRiftyHA39MWEi3m9aunc5MzRF1JYuBsbn6VPcn33UH.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $642k (DefiLlama), of which $334k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: dRiftyHA39MWEi3m9aunc5MzRF1JYuBsbn6VPcn33UH on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account 5Jp7B2…vMd6 on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 4-of-7, 6 can vote of 7 plain keys; delay: 1 h Squads time lock.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 4-of-7, native time lock 1 h 8jj7zJgdr5…BMai via program -> ProgramData 7dLgmt… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig 7qipzLR9j1JcvdxE1XJEFgvoyFmgBpgw5hMdHBMPcJtM, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 6 of 7 members can vote (7 can initiate, 6 can execute): 4-of-7 members, 6 can vote: effectively 4-of-6. The attacker's question: 4 keys move this contract, 1 h to react, $161k behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 4 keys collude to act; 3 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 7 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 429731225 on 2026-06-29 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: a repository is registered, https://github.com/drift-labs/protocol-v2/tree/fee7bfa60f52274969500c37acbbe79bea847ba1). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).