Can one person move the money in Meteora DAMM v2 on Solana? The authority score is 2 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. Program upgrades need 4 of 7 signers, but the program's root admin is a hardcoded pair of bare keys where either one alone is enough. That pair sits at the top of the permission tree, which drives the score near the floor.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 5 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 60 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
Program upgrades need 4 of 7 signers, but the program's root admin is a hardcoded pair of bare keys where either one alone is enough. That pair sits at the top of the permission tree, which drives the score near the floor.
root admin: two hardcoded bare keys, either suffices
The admin list is a compile-time constant in the program source (MeteoraAg/damm-v2), so no account read can show it. It was copied from the verified source and locked with a regression test. Its two keys are on-curve wallets and either alone can create or close operator accounts. Every other privileged action is gated by an operator record that only those keys can set, so the pair is the root of the permission tree. The upgrade path is a Squads v3 multisig, 4-of-7, no delay, shared with Meteora DLMM and DAMM v1. Those two are deliberately not scored: transaction evidence suggests the same keys, but their source is not public.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 2 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 5 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-cpamdpZCGKUy5JxQXB4dcpGPiikHawvSWAd6mEn1sGG.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $24M (DefiLlama), of which $23M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: cpamdpZCGKUy5JxQXB4dcpGPiikHawvSWAd6mEn1sGG on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account J9z7kn…aqA7 on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a program-derived address (not a Squads v4 vault); delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a program-derived address (no key can sign for it directly) JADaUV8kvD…CVLd via program -> ProgramData AUh8bm… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Program last deployed at slot 457080014 on 2026-10-15 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: none registered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).