Can one person move the money in Sanctum validator LSTs (SanctumSpl, SanctumSplMulti) on Solana? The authority score is 54 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Both stake pool programs share Sanctum Infinity's 6-of-11 upgrade committee, with no delay. This is an upper bound: the per-LST pool managers were not enumerated.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 60 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 20 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
Both stake pool programs share Sanctum Infinity's 6-of-11 upgrade committee, with no delay. This is an upper bound: the per-LST pool managers were not enumerated.
upper bound: pool managers not enumerated
Both programs are re-read on every run and must resolve to the same Squads v3 committee. Each LST's pool manager is a bounded role class, like JitoSOL's, but they were not listed, so only the shared upgrade path is scored. Pools such as JupSOL inherit this target once their addresses are confirmed from a primary source. DefiLlama listed over $1.0B for sanctum-validator-lsts on 2026-09-17.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 54 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 60 to 74, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-SP12tWFxD9oJsVWNavTTBZvMbA6gkAmxtVgxdqvyvhY.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $1.8B (DefiLlama), of which $823M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: SP12tWFxD9oJsVWNavTTBZvMbA6gkAmxtVgxdqvyvhY on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account 3JLU3F…yAub on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a program-derived address (not a Squads v4 vault); delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a program-derived address (no key can sign for it directly) 47SND7bGKv…RScz via program -> ProgramData Cn5feg… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Program last deployed at slot 371704212 on 2025-10-07 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: none registered). This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $2.0B behind all of them, DefiLlama): 5ocnV1qiCg… on Solana. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).