Can one person move the money in Jupiter Perpetual Exchange on Solana? The authority score is 46 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. The perps program's upgrade multisig has a 24-hour delay, but its application admin is a 4-of-7 Squads v3 multisig with no delay field, so the delay is bypassed. That multisig also controls Jupiter Aggregator v6 upgrades.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 80 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 40 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 4 keys, 24 h to react, about $188M behind one key.
The perps program's upgrade multisig has a 24-hour delay, but its application admin is a 4-of-7 Squads v3 multisig with no delay field, so the delay is bypassed. That multisig also controls Jupiter Aggregator v6 upgrades.
admin path bypasses the 24h upgrade delay
Program upgrade is a Squads v4 multisig, 4-of-8, 24h delay, moved on 2026-02-11 off the no-delay Squads v3 that still holds Aggregator v6. Perpetuals.admin was decoded at offset 51 of the 120-byte account and matches authority index 1 of Squads v3 multisig 7ZyDFz..., 4-of-7: the same multisig as Aggregator v6's upgrade authority, so one compromise reaches two large Jupiter products. The Doves oracle program shares the upgrade vault, but oracle authority for this target is still an open point. One verifier's claim that the admin PDA could not be reproduced was a bug in its own code. DefiLlama listed over $600M TVL.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 46 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 55 to 89, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-H4ND9aYttUVLFmNypZqLjZ52FYiGvdEB45GmwNoKEjTj.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $750M (DefiLlama), of which $405M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: H4ND9aYttUVLFmNypZqLjZ52FYiGvdEB45GmwNoKEjTj on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account 7rRd5h…Jv5f on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 4-of-8 of 8 plain keys; delay: 24 h Squads time lock.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 4-of-8, native time lock 24 h 5myNNmEmPm…uAKx via account owned by program PERPHjGB… -> program -> ProgramData C258Lj… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig AxkJ8oH5aDu4ZRWfsujPtxdb6Vhq4gDehpoReBgrUUSm, disagrees with the published score: the timelock score says no delay (0), the Squads multisig enforces a native time lock of 24 h. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 8 of 8 members can vote (8 can initiate, 8 can execute). The attacker's question: 4 keys move this contract, 24 h to react, $188M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 4 keys collude to act; 5 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 8 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 413092478 on 2026-04-14 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: none registered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).