Can one person move the money in Raydium (AMM v4, CLMM, CPMM) on Solana? The authority score is 14 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. The three programs share one 3-of-4 Squads v4 upgrade multisig with no delay. A separate hardcoded admin key resolves to an older 2-of-3 Squads v3 multisig that still sets fees and pool status.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 20 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 20 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 3 keys, 0 h to react, about $397M behind one key.
The three programs share one 3-of-4 Squads v4 upgrade multisig with no delay. A separate hardcoded admin key resolves to an older 2-of-3 Squads v3 multisig that still sets fees and pool status.
config admin weaker than the upgrade path
The upgrade authority is one Squads v4 vault, 3-of-4, no time lock, shared by AMM v4, CLMM and CPMM and re-checked per program each run. The admin key is a constant compiled into all three programs, read live from CLMM's on-chain IDL. It can set fee rates, reassign fee owners, pause pools and, on CLMM, transfer reward ownership. It resolves to the Squads v3 multisig that held the upgrade authority until a 2026-04-22 rotation, retired for code upgrades but never rotated for this role. LaunchLab was not re-checked. DefiLlama listed over $1.0B for raydium-amm on 2026-09-17, split by program not verified.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 14 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 20 to 34, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-CAMMCzo5YL8w4VFF8KVHrK22GGUsp5VTaW7grrKgrWqK.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $1.2B (DefiLlama), of which $1.0B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: CAMMCzo5YL8w4VFF8KVHrK22GGUsp5VTaW7grrKgrWqK on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account 8GuwiT…mG7S on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 3-of-4 of 4 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 3-of-4 FytDrVzDyb…eZQK via program -> ProgramData HzD2cC… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig tr8rgazUrZzgdkfc6Q622nVJHMMzh29trdBE2uBHb4u, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 4 of 4 members can vote (4 can initiate, 4 can execute). The attacker's question: 3 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $397M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 3 keys collude to act; 2 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 4 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 451479902 on 2026-09-29 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: a repository is registered, https://github.com/raydium-io/raydium-clmm/tree/119ed36bf9f33). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).