Can one person move the money in PumpSwap and pump.fun bonding curve on Solana? The authority score is 43 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Both programs share one 3-of-4 Squads v4 upgrade multisig with no delay, and their config admin is a different multisig with the same 3-of-4 threshold, so the admin path does not lower the score.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 50 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 75 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 3 keys, 0 h to react, about $115M behind one key.
Both programs share one 3-of-4 Squads v4 upgrade multisig with no delay, and their config admin is a different multisig with the same 3-of-4 threshold, so the admin path does not lower the score.
confirmed by the second path, not lowered
The AMM and the bonding curve share one upgrade vault (3-of-4, no time lock). GlobalConfig.admin (PumpSwap) and Global.authority (bonding curve) both resolve to a different Squads v4 vault, also 3-of-4. The on-chain IDL shows admin as the first field, and a live transaction from that multisig updated both fields together, so it is not a coincidental match. Scouting noted frequent upgrades (2026-09-12 and 2026-09-15) with no delay. It listed over $250M TVL for PumpSwap, while pump.fun itself lists none.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 43 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 50 to 93, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-ADyA8hdefvWN2dbGGWFotbzWxrAvLW83WG6QCVXvJKqw.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $344M (DefiLlama), of which $196M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: ADyA8hdefvWN2dbGGWFotbzWxrAvLW83WG6QCVXvJKqw on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account Hhxa41…Q9ah on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 3-of-4 of 4 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 3-of-4 7gZufwwAo1…jFr8 via account owned by program pAMMBay6… -> program -> ProgramData 6naEzK… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig 2yMoQqQrtbhq3nQ3wFoQQawWS65qcqUXcwHEYha4rshW, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 4 of 4 members can vote (4 can initiate, 4 can execute). 2 former member entries left in the account after removals. The attacker's question: 3 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $115M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 3 keys collude to act; 2 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 4 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 454596406 on 2026-10-08 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: none registered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).