Can one person move the money in Kamino Lend, main market (SOL/BTC) on Solana? The authority score is 56 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Upgrades wait 24 hours and risk changes 12, but a ten-signer group can re-map the price source behind the SOL and USDC reserves with no delay, even to a fixed price. That undelayed path caps the oracle sub-score.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 76 |
| timelock | 25 |
| price feed | 45 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 5 keys, 24 h to react, about $263M behind one key.
Upgrades wait 24 hours and risk changes 12, but a ten-signer group can re-map the price source behind the SOL and USDC reserves with no delay, even to a fixed price. That undelayed path caps the oracle sub-score.
undelayed price-source path
Seven authority paths exist and four feed a score. Program upgrade is a 5-of-10 Squads v4 multisig with a 24h delay, the market owner is 4-of-10 with 12h, the Scope price aggregator admin is 4-of-10 with none, and Scope's own upgrade is 5-of-10 with 24h. The upgrade, Scope admin and Scope upgrade multisigs use the same 10 keys, and the market owner shares 9 of them. Klend rejects prices more than 1,000 bps (SOL) or 300 bps (USDC) from the TWAP, but the same admin can re-map the TWAP source, so no credit was given. Scoring the providers behind Scope is still open, and the emergency council (restrict-only) has an unresolved controller.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 56 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 73, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-7u3HeHxYDLhnCoErrtycNokbQYbWGzLs6JSDqGAv5PfF.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $1.3B (DefiLlama), of which $579M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: 7u3HeHxYDLhnCoErrtycNokbQYbWGzLs6JSDqGAv5PfF on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account FMTQ8r…YCHa on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 5-of-10 of 10 plain keys; delay: 24 h Squads time lock.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 5-of-10, native time lock 24 h GzFgdRJXma…kzkW via account owned by program KLend2g3… -> program -> ProgramData 9uSbGW… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig 6hhBGCtmg7tPWUSgp3LG6X2rsmYWAc4tNsA6G4CnfQbM, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 10 of 10 members can vote (10 can initiate, 10 can execute). The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, 24 h to react, $263M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 5 keys collude to act; 6 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 10 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 440486775 on 2026-08-20 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). Verified build (OtterSec): a build from https://github.com/Kamino-Finance/klend/tree/a08760976f51a3a58c4a0c6ea27b4a0e565bca79 matches the deployed binary, last matched 2026-08-20. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).