Can one person move the money in Solend DAO governance realm on Solana? The authority score is 2 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. Two bare wallets sit above the DAO vote: one can rewrite the voting rules with no proposal, the other can replace the governance program's code. Neither is renounced, and the DAO has not taken over the realm authority.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 5 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react, about $86M behind one key.
Two bare wallets sit above the DAO vote: one can rewrite the voting rules with no proposal, the other can replace the governance program's code. Neither is renounced, and the DAO has not taken over the realm authority.
retroactive backtest of the June 2022 vote
Solend runs its own governance program, not the shared default instance, confirmed live. The realm authority is an active on-curve wallet, and the governance program's upgrade authority is another one. The token-vote path has no council, a 1% yes threshold as decoded (not confirmed by a second method), no execution hold-up and 3 days of voting. In the June 2022 backtest, SLND1 passed with 97.46% yes after a 6-hour vote and SLND2 reversed it the next day; neither touched the realm authority. The backtest is retrospective, not a live catch. The flat token-voting baseline ignores vote concentration, an open gap.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 2 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 5 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-7sf3tcWm58vhtkJMwuw2P3T6UBX7UE5VKxPMnXJUZ1Hn.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $86M (DefiLlama), of which $84M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: 7sf3tcWm58vhtkJMwuw2P3T6UBX7UE5VKxPMnXJUZ1Hn on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account 3Ppaq1…iMpv on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a plain key; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a plain key (bare EOA) 6EpduY…rqU…rqUT via account owned by program A7kmu2kU… -> program -> ProgramData DBvb9p… -> upgrade authority (on the curve: a plain key), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, no delay to react, $86M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). Program last deployed at slot 138109469 on 2022-06-19 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: none registered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).