Can one person move the money in Jupiter Lend on Solana? The authority score is 56 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Four programs share one 4-of-6 upgrade multisig with a 12-hour delay, while the liquidity admin is a separate 5-of-10 multisig with a 6-hour delay. The score is a bound: three of the four admin accounts were not re-read.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 87 |
| timelock | 13 |
| price feed | 20 |
| shared control | 60 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 4 keys, 12 h to react, about $278M behind one key.
Four programs share one 4-of-6 upgrade multisig with a 12-hour delay, while the liquidity admin is a separate 5-of-10 multisig with a 6-hour delay. The score is a bound: three of the four admin accounts were not re-read.
bound, not final: 3 of 4 admins not re-read
The liquidity, lending, vaults and oracle programs share one Squads v4 upgrade vault, 4-of-6, 12h delay. Liquidity.authority is a different Squads v4 vault, 5-of-10, 6h delay, and its shorter delay lowered the score from the scouted upper bound. Scouting reported the same vault for the lending, vaults and oracle admin accounts, but only the Liquidity account was re-read byte for byte; any difference could only match or weaken it. AuthorizationList (auth_users, guardians) was not decoded. Scouting noted the oracle program shares the lending upgrade multisig, so one quorum can change code and price source. DefiLlama listed over $900M TVL.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 56 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 74, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-7s1da8DduuBFqGra5bJBjpnvL5E9mGzCuMk1Qkh4or2Z.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $1.1B (DefiLlama), of which $490M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: 7s1da8DduuBFqGra5bJBjpnvL5E9mGzCuMk1Qkh4or2Z on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account B5smEt…S7y4 on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 4-of-6 of 6 plain keys; delay: 12 h Squads time lock.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 4-of-6, native time lock 12 h 4MsgBB5VPo…ZMSJ via account owned by program jupeiUmn… -> program -> ProgramData J6Ry5y… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig J3mJ3wz6xkVUk3T8qHnuAYNxsRH3ixHsryYNZAU2vG8P, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-12. 6 of 6 members can vote (6 can initiate, 6 can execute). 4 former member entries left in the account after removals. The attacker's question: 4 keys move this contract, 12 h to react, $278M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 4 keys collude to act; 3 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 6 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 453953579 on 2026-10-06 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: none registered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).