Can one person move the money in Orca Whirlpool on Solana? The authority score is 2 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. Upgrades look strong (24-hour delay, 5-of-13), but a separate reward authority on the same config is a 1-of-8 multisig with no delay, which scores like a single key. Counting it as full-power is a disclosed judgment call.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 5 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 5 keys, 24 h to react, about $60M behind one key.
Upgrades look strong (24-hour delay, 5-of-13), but a separate reward authority on the same config is a 1-of-8 multisig with no delay, which scores like a single key. Counting it as full-power is a disclosed judgment call.
judgment call: reward authority counted as full-power
WhirlpoolsConfig holds three authorities. fee_authority is the same Squads v4 vault as the program upgrade (5-of-13, 9 can vote, 24h delay). collect_protocol_fees_authority is a bare wallet but only withdraws already accrued fees, so it is bounded and not scored. reward_emissions_super_authority is a different Squads v4 vault, 1-of-8, no delay. It can reassign the reward authority of any pool without that pool's consent, and that authority can set the pool's emission rate. A reviewer could argue it is bounded, and the scorer lays out the reasoning. DefiLlama listed over $200M TVL on 2026-09-17.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 2 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 5 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-2LecshUwdy9xi7meFgHtFJQNSKk4KdTrcpvaB56dP2NQ.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $300M (DefiLlama), of which $294M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Program or account: 2LecshUwdy9xi7meFgHtFJQNSKk4KdTrcpvaB56dP2NQ on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account ACfvde…dJnF on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 5-of-13, 9 can vote of 13 plain keys; delay: 24 h Squads time lock.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 5-of-13, native time lock 24 h GwH3Hiv5mA…x4PV via account owned by program whirLbMi… -> program -> ProgramData CtXfPz… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF, disagrees with the published score: the score says one key does everything (5), the upgrade authority is a Squads v4 via account owned by program whirLbMi… -> program -> ProgramData CtXfPz… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig BQsDWkL417U4tVE2sDnPks469pKdm6YzFgKH77doiEjF; the multisig score says no real multisig (0), the Squads multisig is a 5-of-13; the timelock score says no delay (0), the Squads multisig enforces a native time lock of 24 h. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 9 of 13 members can vote (4 can initiate, 3 can execute): 5-of-13 members, 9 can vote: effectively 5-of-9. 9 former member entries left in the account after removals. The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, 24 h to react, $60M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 5 keys collude to act; 5 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 13 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 457152296 on 2026-10-15 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: a repository is registered, https://github.com/orca-so/whirlpools). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).