Can one person move the money in Loopscale (Loopscale, Beam) on Solana? The authority score is 70 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. The program upgrade authority is a Squads v4 multisig: 4-of-7 voters out of 9 members, with a 24-hour time lock. This is an upper bound: only the program upgrade path is scored, the in-state admin, mint and config authorities are not traced.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 75 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 83 |
| timelock | 50 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 4 keys, 24 h to react.
The program upgrade authority is a Squads v4 multisig: 4-of-7 voters out of 9 members, with a 24-hour time lock. This is an upper bound: only the program upgrade path is scored, the in-state admin, mint and config authorities are not traced.
4-of-7 voters out of 9 members, composite 70
Pushed on-chain 2026-10-10 (first publication of this target). Scored 75 / 83 / 50. The program's upgrade authority is re-read on every run and must equal the offline vault PDA of the named Squads multisig. Loopscale and Beam share the upgrade authority.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 57.50% (score 70). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 75 to 99, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/solana-1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count); the protocol's total value locked (no DefiLlama match).
Program or account: 1oopBoJG58DgkUVKkEzKgyG9dvRmpgeEm1AVjoHkF78 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: it lives in the account 7oDf7p…bNBN on Solana Devnet (PDA, seeds ["score", target], program 5Vhi…Yh4W): byte 45 is the composite, bytes 46 to 53 the last update; stale once last_updated + Registry.max_staleness_seconds has passed. The target itself lives on mainnet. The score takes the weakest of every full-power authority path (program upgrade authority, config-account admins, reward or fee authorities); a Squads whose threshold is 1 counts as one key, so a site that reads only the upgrade multisig can show a higher number for the same protocol.
Read on 2026-10-15 18:53 UTC, methodology 0x4f8c4019b9c9e75b…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: Squads 4-of-9, 7 can vote of 9 plain keys; delay: 24 h Squads time lock.
Independent read of the admin: a Squads v4 multisig 4-of-9, native time lock 24 h DwBXwJDZ4A…Efft via program -> ProgramData 8KbXd8… -> upgrade authority (a program-derived address, off the curve: a Squads vault or a protocol PDA, no key can sign for it directly) -> Squads v4 vault 0 of multisig C4awuufiuL8DNT5wMDP27HneKKqbgynrsbCa4XYGSuPk, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 7 of 9 members can vote (8 can initiate, 6 can execute): 4-of-9 members, 7 can vote: effectively 4-of-7. 4 keys collude to act; 4 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 9 plain keys. Program last deployed at slot 440130674 on 2026-08-18 (ProgramData; an upgrade moves this slot and the watch says so). No verified build matching the deployed binary (OtterSec: none registered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).