Can one person move the money in Spark Liquidity Layer (ALMProxy) on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 32 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.
In short. Left open in an earlier pass as an unrecognized proxy shape - turned out not to be a proxy at all, but Spark’s own ALMProxy dispatcher, gated by the identical executor contract already traced for Spark Savings USDG.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 50 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 30 |
| timelock | 10 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
Left open in an earlier pass as an unrecognized proxy shape - turned out not to be a proxy at all, but Spark’s own ALMProxy dispatcher, gated by the identical executor contract already traced for Spark Savings USDG.
resolved a real open thread, not repeated
A DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE replay from genesis confirms one current holder, matched by address AND bytecode size (8,113 bytes) to the exact same executor instance administering Spark Savings USDG - its L1-authenticated governance chain (resolving to Sky/MakerDAO’s own verified "SubProxy") is therefore identical too, re-verified live rather than assumed.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 32 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 50 to 69, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is At least a 3-of-5 multisig (too few people need to agree).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0xfd2fd4b046136b540a56c11c75ac679ae7d1db24.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $2k (DefiLlama), of which $1k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xfd2fd4b046136b540a56c11c75ac679ae7d1db24 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xfd2fd4b046136b540a56c11c75ac679ae7d1db24) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin role seen: a timelock 0x826aeaeee9233fa8ba199518dd8621a5962b1d02 holds the admin role (hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) answered yes). This contract does not list its role holders, so the reader asked 30 known holders and others may hold it too: this is proof of one holder, never a complete list.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (AccessControl (ERC-165) whose admin-role holders are not enumerable on-chain: read them from RoleGranted events; nothing for this reader to compare). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000fd2fd4b046136b540a56c11c75ac679ae7d1db24"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (32 = 0x20); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.