UNCX Network V3 Locker · authority risk 31/100, weak

Can one person move the money in UNCX Network V3 Locker on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 31 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.

In short. Owned by a real 2-of-3 Gnosis Safe (v1.4.1, no module, guard slot zero, three bare-EOA owners) with no timelock in the path. Simulated against the live contract, that Safe cannot withdraw or migrate any locked position, but it can name the auto-collect account and zero a lock’s protocol fee, which lets that lock’s uncollected trading fees be redirected.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key50
multisig35
timelock0
price feed100
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: 2 keys, 0 h to react, about $3M behind one key.

Why this score

Owned by a real 2-of-3 Gnosis Safe (v1.4.1, no module, guard slot zero, three bare-EOA owners) with no timelock in the path. Simulated against the live contract, that Safe cannot withdraw or migrate any locked position, but it can name the auto-collect account and zero a lock’s protocol fee, which lets that lock’s uncollected trading fees be redirected.

fees exposed, principal not

The locker is non-upgradeable and every state-changing function in UNCX’s public source is present in the deployed bytecode. Principal stays out of the Safe’s reach (withdraw, migrate and decreaseLiquidity are gated by each lock’s own owner), and the score of 31 rests on the 2-of-3 threshold with no discount for these limits. UNCX’s second locker (unicrypt-v4) shares the same owner Safe but is not tracked.

3 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 31 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 50 to 73, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is At least a 3-of-5 multisig (too few people need to agree).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: UNCX Network V3 Locker](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Frobinhood-chain%2F0xf28704c691290547924e2129d407da36bda8ce0f.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0xf28704c691290547924e2129d407da36bda8ce0f.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Not assessed for this contract: shared control: the score says no key is shared, but this contract's own independent read lists another tracked contract with the same admin (unresolved, 12/10: do not read "no key shared" as established).

Money behind it: $6M (DefiLlama), of which $4M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0xf28704c691290547924e2129d407da36bda8ce0f on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xf28704c691290547924e2129d407da36bda8ce0f) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x31c4…9693 has executed 10 transactions (last seen moving on 2026-10-15). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.

Read live: admin: Safe 2-of-3 of 3 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 2-of-3 0x31c4…969…9693 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 2 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $3M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 2 keys collude to act; 2 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 3 plain keys. This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $6M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x128a800c… on Robinhood Chain. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (5 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xf28704c691290547924e2129d407da36bda8ce0f","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (latest block: this RPC cannot replay the block of the build, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000f28704c691290547924e2129d407da36bda8ce0f"},"latest"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (31 = 0x1f); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.