Can one person move the money in LayerZero V2 messaging core on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 48 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. A real, heavily-used cross-chain messaging layer - 709 OApps already registered - owned by a bespoke 5-of-7 multisig that isn’t a Gnosis Safe at all.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 85 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
A real, heavily-used cross-chain messaging layer - 709 OApps already registered - owned by a bespoke 5-of-7 multisig that isn’t a Gnosis Safe at all.
new in batch 8
A live eth_getLogs replay of DelegateSet on LayerZero’s own EndpointV2, from genesis to the chain tip, found 965 events from 709 distinct OApp addresses already registered - a real, active messaging surface an order of magnitude larger than everything this oracle tracked before, and structurally separate from the chain’s own L1 rollup bridge above. EndpointV2, SendUln302 and ReceiveUln302 were each checked independently and all three share the identical owner() - deliberately NOT a Gnosis Safe (getOwners()/getThreshold() both revert on it), but a bespoke on-chain multisig confirmed live as a real 5-of-7 via its own getSigners()/threshold() interface. Executor, a fourth LayerZero contract, was deliberately excluded: its own admin resolves to a third, still-unidentified contract matching neither pattern - an open thread, not guessed at. Only this shared infrastructure is scored - the 709 individual OApps built on top of it are not tracked one by one.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 48 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 55 to 85, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0xe1844c5d63a9543023008d332bd3d2e6f1fe1043.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: shared control: the score says no key is shared, but this contract's own independent read lists another tracked contract with the same admin (unresolved, 12/10: do not read "no key shared" as established); how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $921k (DefiLlama), of which $479k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xe1844c5d63a9543023008d332bd3d2e6f1fe1043 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xe1844c5d63a9543023008d332bd3d2e6f1fe1043) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0xe590…394…3942 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. This holder also governs 2 other tracked contracts (about $921k behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x6f475642… on Robinhood Chain, 0xc39161c7… on Robinhood Chain. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xe1844c5d63a9543023008d332bd3d2e6f1fe1043","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000e1844c5d63a9543023008d332bd3d2e6f1fe1043"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (48 = 0x30); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.