Meridian Perps (ExchangeGateway + merUSD) · authority risk 16/100, critical

Can one person move the money in Meridian Perps (ExchangeGateway + merUSD) on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 16 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.

In short. ExchangeGateway.owner() and merUSD.owner() resolve to the exact same bare EOA (real nonce 84) on both independent RPCs - one key controls the perps exchange and its own settlement stablecoin.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key40
multisig0
timelock0
price feed100
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: 2 keys, 0 h to react, about $1M behind one key.

Why this score

ExchangeGateway.owner() and merUSD.owner() resolve to the exact same bare EOA (real nonce 84) on both independent RPCs - one key controls the perps exchange and its own settlement stablecoin.

A separately-checked LP vault has no exposed admin surface of its own (owner/curator/admin/manager/governance all revert) - all real authority here sits on the exchange gateway. Scored with the same convention already used for Curve DEX’s identical one-key-two-contracts pattern.

2 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 16 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 40 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Meridian Perps (ExchangeGateway + merUSD](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Frobinhood-chain%2F0xd540f47f214dc7d6d244e62a6ae7e06b586ef44a.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0xd540f47f214dc7d6d244e62a6ae7e06b586ef44a.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Money behind it: $3M (DefiLlama), of which $2M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0xd540f47f214dc7d6d244e62a6ae7e06b586ef44a on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xd540f47f214dc7d6d244e62a6ae7e06b586ef44a) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0xf806…a5f7 has executed 6 transactions (last seen moving on 2026-10-15). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.

Read live: admin: Safe 2-of-3 of 3 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 2-of-3 0xf8067d8c…a5f7 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 2 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $1M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 2 keys collude to act; 2 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 3 plain keys. Implementation behind the proxy: 0x0f17d8468c49d6c80e4ee10cc87a767085a4b9a8 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). Its source is verified on Sourcify (ExchangeGateway, exact match, 0.8.28+commit.7893614a). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score over time (3 points, 2026-10-10 to 2026-10-13, from the chained log): 2026-10-10: 12026-10-10: 162026-10-13: 16 1 to 16 to 16 Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (6 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xd540f47f214dc7d6d244e62a6ae7e06b586ef44a","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xf8067d8ca90b8510ce8ade1eec24b7260eafa5f7","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xf8067d8ca90b8510ce8ade1eec24b7260eafa5f7","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xf8067d8ca90b8510ce8ade1eec24b7260eafa5f7","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0xf8067d8ca90b8510ce8ade1eec24b7260eafa5f7","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0xd540f47f214dc7d6d244e62a6ae7e06b586ef44a","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (latest block: this RPC cannot replay the block of the build, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000d540f47f214dc7d6d244e62a6ae7e06b586ef44a"},"latest"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (16 = 0x10); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.