Can one person move the money in Morpho Ethena x Steakhouse USDG vault on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 70 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. The largest raw multisig found on this chain - a real 5-of-10 Safe at owner - still capped by the same zero-delay authority gap, and shares its curator Safe with the Steakhouse vault.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 70 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 65 |
| timelock | 75 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 40 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 5 keys, 0 h to react, about $0k behind one key.
The largest raw multisig found on this chain - a real 5-of-10 Safe at owner - still capped by the same zero-delay authority gap, and shares its curator Safe with the Steakhouse vault.
cross-exposure: 80
~$23.6M TVL, the largest single TVL found on this chain. curator() is the identical 3-of-7 Safe as the Morpho Steakhouse USDG vault - all 7 owners overlap, dropping both vaults' crossExposureScore from 100 to 80 (batch 7). owner() resolves two hops through a non-Safe contract to a real 5-of-10 Safe. Best-governed vault found on this chain, but setOwner/setCurator timelocks are still 0. Not flagged as a hidden risk: Steakhouse Financial curating two vaults on the same chain is a normal, visible relationship - but it is still a real fact a lending market treating these as independently-governed collateral would get wrong.
Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 57.50% (score 70). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 70 to 94, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is No key shared with another tracked protocol (the same keys control other protocols).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0xbeeff0fb1dc19344a87b8479dab60a2e16160737.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $525M (DefiLlama), of which $157M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xbeeff0fb1dc19344a87b8479dab60a2e16160737 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xbeeff0fb1dc19344a87b8479dab60a2e16160737) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Other hands: curator() is a Safe 3-of-7 (0x9023…d2fb). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0xd062…5ef4 has executed 6 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 5-of-10 behind a bare contract; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x261a3b7a…f2b1 via owner() -> owner() of the holder (safe 5-of-10), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is a Safe 5-of-10: that is the hand. The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $0k behind each key ($0k of USDG held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $525M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0xbeefff13… on Robinhood Chain. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score over time (3 points, 2026-10-10 to 2026-10-13, from the chained log): 46 to 70 to 70 Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xbeeff0fb1dc19344a87b8479dab60a2e16160737","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000beeff0fb1dc19344a87b8479dab60a2e16160737"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (70 = 0x46); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.