Can one person move the money in Morpho Steakhouse USDG vault on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 44 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Root owner resolves to a bare EOA two hops down; the real 7-day timelock never covers setOwner / setCurator / setIsSentinel. Shares its curator Safe with the Ethena x Steakhouse vault.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 5 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 65 |
| timelock | 75 |
| price feed | 2 |
| shared control | 40 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react, about $525M behind one key.
Root owner resolves to a bare EOA two hops down; the real 7-day timelock never covers setOwner / setCurator / setIsSentinel. Shares its curator Safe with the Ethena x Steakhouse vault.
cross-exposure: 80
curator() is a real 3-of-7 Safe, and isSentinel() is true for a 1-of-7 Safe sharing the same seven owners - but owner() points through an 8,609-byte contract to a bare EOA two hops down. Per-function timelocks are real (604,800s / 7 days) on addAdapter / removeAdapter / cap changes, but setOwner, setCurator, setIsSentinel and decreaseAbsoluteCap all resolve to 0. A curator/sentinel layer that looks like real multisig protection sits behind a root that isn’t multisig-protected at all. Its curator Safe's all 7 owners are shared with the Morpho Ethena x Steakhouse USDG vault (batch 7 crossExposureScore: 80/100) - the only overlap found across all 15 tracked signer groups.
Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 44 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 5 to 44, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0xbeeff033f34c046626b8d0a041844c5d1a5409dd.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $525M (DefiLlama), of which $294M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xbeeff033f34c046626b8d0a041844c5d1a5409dd on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xbeeff033f34c046626b8d0a041844c5d1a5409dd) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Other hands: curator() is a Safe 3-of-7 (0x9023…d2fb). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.
Read live: admin: a plain key behind a bare contract; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0xca50d23f…db73 via owner() -> owner() of the holder (eoa), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Behind the holder, its owner() is a plain key 0x337f…7660: that is the hand. The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, no delay to react, $525M behind each key ($525M of USDG held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score over time (3 points, 2026-10-10 to 2026-10-13, from the chained log): 19 to 44 to 44 Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xbeeff033f34c046626b8d0a041844c5d1a5409dd","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000beeff033f34c046626b8d0a041844c5d1a5409dd"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (44 = 0x2c); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.