Can one person move the money in Ramses CL V2 on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 8 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. A real DEX with $6.3M TVL, governed through a Timelock whose delay is deliberately set to zero - arguably worse than no timelock at all.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 15 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 5 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react, about $6M behind one key.
A real DEX with $6.3M TVL, governed through a Timelock whose delay is deliberately set to zero - arguably worse than no timelock at all.
Governed through a centralized AccessHub rather than per-contract Ownable. DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is held by both "RamsesTimelock" and an address labeled "Ramses Team Multisig" - traced one hop further rather than trusting the label: that "multisig" is a Safe with exactly one owner and threshold 1, the sole signer a bare EOA. RamsesTimelock.getMinDelay() returns 0 - a real, deployed timelock-shaped contract with none of the substance. Batch 8 pinned down RamsesTimelock’s exact address (previously undistinguished from AccessHub) and found PROPOSER_ROLE, CANCELLER_ROLE and EXECUTOR_ROLE are all held by that same single "Team Multisig" address - a timelock in name only, on every axis, not just its delay.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 8 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 15 to 45, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0xa203a21dccb461e415daa342e8e635b6cee0ccb3.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: shared control: the score says no key is shared, but this contract's own independent read lists another tracked contract with the same admin (unresolved, 12/10: do not read "no key shared" as established).
Money behind it: $6M (DefiLlama), of which $5M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0xa203a21dccb461e415daa342e8e635b6cee0ccb3 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xa203a21dccb461e415daa342e8e635b6cee0ccb3) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x20d6…be1a has executed 554 transactions (last seen moving on 2026-10-15). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 1-of-2 of 2 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 1-of-2, whose owners are eoa, eoa 0x20d6…be1…be1a via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, no delay to react, $6M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 1 key collude to act; 2 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 2 plain keys. This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $6M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x83341f89… on Robinhood Chain. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xa203a21dccb461e415daa342e8e635b6cee0ccb3","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000a203a21dccb461e415daa342e8e635b6cee0ccb3"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (8 = 0x8); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.