Can one person move the money in Morpho Blue (singleton, Robinhood Chain) on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 55 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. By chain-specific TVL, the single largest authority surface on this chain, and previously miscategorized as "already covered" by the individual vaults built on top of it. It is not: the singleton’s own owner is a separate, additional layer underneath every vault and market here.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 95 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 5 keys, 0 h to react, about $119M behind one key.
By chain-specific TVL, the single largest authority surface on this chain, and previously miscategorized as "already covered" by the individual vaults built on top of it. It is not: the singleton’s own owner is a separate, additional layer underneath every vault and market here.
~$538M chain TVL, cross-exposure: 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20)
owner() resolves to a real Gnosis Safe. Per Morpho’s own immutable-core design, it can only enable new IRMs/LLTVs for future markets and set the (capped) protocol fee, so it cannot touch funds already deposited in existing markets, including Longbow’s 55 isolated markets built on this same singleton. Scored on the root mechanism itself, the same convention as every other Safe-rooted target here. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20: the owner Safe’s 9 signers at 5-of-9 are the same committee as the Morpho Blue owner Safes on Ethereum L1, Base and Tempo (the Safe address differs on some of these chains, the owner set does not), so crossExposureScore is folded to a flat 80 (composite unchanged). It is a dated flag on this target’s signer group, not a live comparison against the other chains.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 55 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 65 to 78, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0x9d53d5e3bd5e8d4cbfa6db1ca238aea02e651010.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $595M (DefiLlama), of which $268M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x9d53d5e3bd5e8d4cbfa6db1ca238aea02e651010 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x9d53d5e3bd5e8d4cbfa6db1ca238aea02e651010) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x0605…9728 has never executed a transaction (nonce 0): this admin path has not been exercised on-chain. A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 5-of-9 of 9 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 5-of-9 0x0605…972…9728 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 5 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $119M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 5 keys collude to act; 5 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 9 plain keys. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9d53d5e3bd5e8d4cbfa6db1ca238aea02e651010","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000009d53d5e3bd5e8d4cbfa6db1ca238aea02e651010"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (55 = 0x37); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.