Can one person move the money in Lighter (zkLighter) Escrow proxy on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 54 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. A real 3-of-5 Safe behind a real 21-day upgrade delay - undercut by a single bare-EOA override that can zero the delay on demand.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 75 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 65 |
| timelock | 15 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
A real 3-of-5 Safe behind a real 21-day upgrade delay - undercut by a single bare-EOA override that can zero the delay on demand.
UpgradeGatekeeper enforces a genuine 21-day notice period (1,814,400s) before the 3-of-5 "master" Safe’s upgrade takes effect. But the gatekeeper’s own verified source exposes cutUpgradeNoticePeriod(), callable by a single securityCouncilAddress - confirmed on-chain as a bare EOA, not the "3-of-5 security council" third-party write-ups (L2BEAT, a Medium post) describe. One private key can zero the 21-day window the instant the Safe queues an upgrade.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 54 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 75 to 89, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0x94bab9693ba2f6358507effcbd372b0660afff9d.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $113M (DefiLlama), of which $52M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x94bab9693ba2f6358507effcbd372b0660afff9d on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x94bab9693ba2f6358507effcbd372b0660afff9d) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a contract the reader cannot classify; delay: unknown.
Independent read of the admin: a contract 0x43cff77c…2716 via EIP-1967 admin, consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Implementation behind the proxy: 0x998ecf039eb110b72f5f6c1ea31c2fa41a458faa (EIP-1967 implementation slot). No verified source on Sourcify for the code behind this proxy (this watch asks Sourcify only; an explorer of the chain may hold one). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x94bab9693ba2f6358507effcbd372b0660afff9d","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","0x55508a0"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x94bab9693ba2f6358507effcbd372b0660afff9d","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000094bab9693ba2f6358507effcbd372b0660afff9d"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (54 = 0x36); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.