Can one person move the money in Curve DEX on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 1 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. The exact same bare EOA is both the AMM factory’s admin() and the fee-receiver/x-gov vault’s owner(), so one key controls the DEX’s parameters and its protocol fees.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 2 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react, about $601k behind one key.
The exact same bare EOA is both the AMM factory’s admin() and the fee-receiver/x-gov vault’s owner(), so one key controls the DEX’s parameters and its protocol fees.
single-RPC only, cross-exposure: 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20)
Confirmed via eth_getCode: 0 bytecode, a bare EOA. Only checked against the single official Robinhood Chain mainnet RPC so far; a second-RPC cross-check attempt 404’d, so this is flagged single-source rather than presented as this project’s usual 2-RPC-confirmed standard. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20: the same bare EOA (0xabc336d4…1cbF) is also the StableSwap factory admin on Monad, so crossExposureScore is folded to a flat 80 (composite unchanged). An identical EOA address is the identical key, and the flag is a dated claim confirmed by the cross-ecosystem sweep script, not a live read of Monad.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 1 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 2 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0x8271e06e5887fe5ba05234f5315c19f3ec90e8ad.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $601k (DefiLlama), of which $595k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x8271e06e5887fe5ba05234f5315c19f3ec90e8ad on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x8271e06e5887fe5ba05234f5315c19f3ec90e8ad) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a plain key, 1 transactions sent; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a plain key (bare EOA) 0xabc3…1cb…1cbf via admin(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. This key has sent 1 transaction. The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, no delay to react, $601k behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). This holder also governs 1 other tracked contract (about $11M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x8271e06e… on Monad. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# admin() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x8271e06e5887fe5ba05234f5315c19f3ec90e8ad","data":"0xf851a440"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# eth_getCode on the holder: 0x means a plain key
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["<holder>","latest"]}'
# eth_getTransactionCount on the holder: how many transactions this key has sent (1 at the read)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionCount","params":["<holder>","0x55508a0"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000008271e06e5887fe5ba05234f5315c19f3ec90e8ad"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (1 = 0x1); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.