Can one person move the money in NOXA Fun Launch Locker on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 2 / 100 (critical): one key or a tiny group.
In short. A lead deliberately left open in an earlier pass, resolved properly this time: every one of the 36 real function selectors in the locker’s bytecode was extracted and checked against a public signature database - no principal-moving function exists anywhere in the set.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 5 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 0 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 1 key, 0 h to react, about $4M behind one key.
A lead deliberately left open in an earlier pass, resolved properly this time: every one of the 36 real function selectors in the locker’s bytecode was extracted and checked against a public signature database - no principal-moving function exists anywhere in the set.
a real negative result, not a partial scan
owner() is a bare EOA. The only state-changing functions found are a fee-management module (setFeeCollector/setProtocolFeeRecipient/setProtocolFeeShare/collectFees) plus standard OZ Ownable/NFT-receiver selectors - no withdraw/unlock/migrate/decreaseLiquidity/sweep anywhere. The locker genuinely holds 60,142 real Uniswap V3 LP positions (confirmed live), just with no selector that could move them out. Scored as a standalone bare-EOA target, same convention as Curve DEX.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 2 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to weak (20): admin key from 5 to 49, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0x7f03effbd7ceb22a3f80dd468f67ef27826acd85.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $4M (DefiLlama), of which $4M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x7f03effbd7ceb22a3f80dd468f67ef27826acd85 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x7f03effbd7ceb22a3f80dd468f67ef27826acd85) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a plain key, 45 transactions sent; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a plain key (bare EOA) 0x7e03…242…242b via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. This key has sent 45 transactions. The attacker's question: 1 key moves this contract, no delay to react, $4M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x7f03effbd7ceb22a3f80dd468f67ef27826acd85","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# eth_getCode on the holder: 0x means a plain key
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getCode","params":["<holder>","latest"]}'
# eth_getTransactionCount on the holder: how many transactions this key has sent (45 at the read)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getTransactionCount","params":["<holder>","0x55508a0"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000007f03effbd7ceb22a3f80dd468f67ef27826acd85"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (2 = 0x2); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.