Can one person move the money in Pendle V2 on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 42 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. Both ProxyAdmins are real, distinct Safes (3-of-5 and 3-of-6), MarketFactoryV6’s owner is Pendle’s governance proxy whose DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is held by the same 3-of-5 Safe, and no timelock gates any of the three.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 70 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 45 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 3 keys, 0 h to react, about $221k behind one key.
Both ProxyAdmins are real, distinct Safes (3-of-5 and 3-of-6), MarketFactoryV6’s owner is Pendle’s governance proxy whose DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is held by the same 3-of-5 Safe, and no timelock gates any of the three.
cross-exposure: 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20), same Safe as Plasma Pendle
ProxyAdmin.owner() and devProxyAdmin.owner() each resolve to a genuinely different, independently-composed Gnosis Safe. MarketFactoryV6.owner() is a 225-byte ERC-1967 proxy, Pendle’s governance proxy, with no owner() getter; read with hasRole on two RPCs on 2026-09-20, its DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is held by the same 3-of-5 Safe that owns ProxyAdmin (the same proxy address and the same admin Safe exist on Plasma), so this third path adds no weaker link and the score does not move. A separate GUARDIAN key can freeze markets (availability-only), disclosed by the 2026-09-20 sweep and not scored. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20: the 3-of-5 Safe that owns ProxyAdmin is the same address, with the same 5 owners, that owns Pendle’s Router on Plasma, so crossExposureScore is folded to a flat 80 (composite unchanged). It is a dated, hand-confirmed flag on this target’s signer group, not a live comparison against Plasma.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 42 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): timelock from 0 to 60, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is At least a 3-of-5 multisig (too few people need to agree).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0x544bf81c855ae84c1e8b65d5e38770898d01eee2.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $663k (DefiLlama), of which $384k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x544bf81c855ae84c1e8b65d5e38770898d01eee2 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x544bf81c855ae84c1e8b65d5e38770898d01eee2) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x7877…75ac has executed 3 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 3-of-5 of 5 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 3-of-5 0x7877…75a…75ac via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 3 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $221k behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 3 keys collude to act; 3 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 5 plain keys. Implementation behind the proxy: 0xb8b037cec8603a384da270a73715cd903f7e8ac8 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). Its source is verified on Sourcify (PendleMarketFactoryV7Upg, exact match, 0.8.30+commit.73712a01). This holder also governs 2 other tracked contracts (about $103M behind all of them, DefiLlama): 0x88888888… on Arbitrum, 0x88888888… on Plasma. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x544bf81c855ae84c1e8b65d5e38770898d01eee2","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","0x55508a0"]}'
# owner() on the address the slot returned (a ProxyAdmin): the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<address from the slot>","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x544bf81c855ae84c1e8b65d5e38770898d01eee2","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000544bf81c855ae84c1e8b65d5e38770898d01eee2"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (42 = 0x2a); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.