Can one person move the money in Alandale V3 Factory on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 43 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. One plain 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe (v1.4.1, no module, guard slot zero, five bare-EOA owners) is the factory’s owner, its ProxyAdmin’s owner and its sole DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE holder, so it controls both the factory’s settings and the right to replace its logic, with no timelock in the path.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 55 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 3 keys, 0 h to react.
One plain 3-of-5 Gnosis Safe (v1.4.1, no module, guard slot zero, five bare-EOA owners) is the factory’s owner, its ProxyAdmin’s owner and its sole DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE holder, so it controls both the factory’s settings and the right to replace its logic, with no timelock in the path.
~$1.14M TVL, recomputed from pool balances
No source was read: the deployed logic matches Algebra Integral v1.0’s factory interface (35 of 35 reference selectors present) plus about ten unrecognized selectors, so the score rests only on the ownership and upgrade chain. Pool plugins, any voter or gauge contracts and the separate Alandale V2 factory were not traced.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 43 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): timelock from 0 to 57, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0x16494a80e08bcb9285d87b67149d7b01774d82f8.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count); the protocol's total value locked (no DefiLlama match).
Contract: 0x16494a80e08bcb9285d87b67149d7b01774d82f8 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x16494a80e08bcb9285d87b67149d7b01774d82f8) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x2a04…2b0e has executed 155 transactions (last seen moving on 2026-10-15). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 3-of-5 of 5 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 3-of-5 0x2a04…2b0…2b0e via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. 3 keys collude to act; 3 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 5 plain keys. Implementation behind the proxy: 0x8c3bbdabf7b610d54097420e485a5e0e7bd68684 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). No verified source on Sourcify for the code behind this proxy (this watch asks Sourcify only; an explorer of the chain may hold one). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x16494a80e08bcb9285d87b67149d7b01774d82f8","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","0x55508a0"]}'
# owner() on the address the slot returned (a ProxyAdmin): the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<address from the slot>","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x16494a80e08bcb9285d87b67149d7b01774d82f8","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000016494a80e08bcb9285d87b67149d7b01774d82f8"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (43 = 0x2b); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.