Can one person move the money in Arcus Perps BridgeVault on Robinhood Chain? The authority score is 31 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.
In short. Deposit and withdrawal custody vault for Arcus Perps. Its admin role is held by a real 24-hour timelock and, in parallel, by a validator contract whose 2-of-3 bare-EOA quorum can, per Arcus’s published ABI, run arbitrary calls with only a deadline field, so the delay may not bind that path.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 50 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 35 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys not read, 24 h to react.
Deposit and withdrawal custody vault for Arcus Perps. Its admin role is held by a real 24-hour timelock and, in parallel, by a validator contract whose 2-of-3 bare-EOA quorum can, per Arcus’s published ABI, run arbitrary calls with only a deadline field, so the delay may not bind that path.
24.2M arcUSDG held, cross-exposure 80
DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is held by three contracts: the timelock (getMinDelay 86,400s), ValidatorConsensus (threshold 2 of 3 validators, all bare EOAs) and CheckpointManager. The timelock’s proposer, executor and canceller roles are held by ValidatorConsensus, CheckpointManager and one further address, a 2-of-4 Safe that is also one of the three owners of the Arcus pToken 2-of-3 Safe, which is why crossExposureScore is 80. Arcus publishes ABIs only, so the claim that the validator quorum can route around the delay comes from the signature of executeGovernanceAction (arbitrary calls plus a deadline, no delay field), not from source, and that function has never run (executedGovernanceCount is 0).
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 31 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 50 to 73, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is At least a 3-of-5 multisig (too few people need to agree).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/robinhood-0x14b107cf534239c59571b066cb6497a321da897c.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $58M (DefiLlama), of which $40M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x14b107cf534239c59571b066cb6497a321da897c on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-13; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x14b107cf534239c59571b066cb6497a321da897c) on the Robinhood Chain oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 136039274, methodology 0x667dc486af9557a8…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 24 h on the timelock; in flight: upgrade executed since the previous run.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 86400s delay 0x0da180b1…001d via DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member 1 of 3 (AccessControl), disagrees with the published score: the timelock score says no delay (0), the live read finds a timelock of 24 h in the admin path via DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member 1 of 3 (AccessControl). Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Upgrade executed: implementation changed since the previous run: 0x44c6c2a96e7e51eb0dd81cef58940faa39babf78 -> 0x71fce0590d6ce46d92e9fd982e1d65bb8aac6319 (EIP-1967 implementation slot); the score reads who may upgrade, this is an upgrade that happened. Implementation behind the proxy: 0x71fce0590d6ce46d92e9fd982e1d65bb8aac6319 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). No verified source on Sourcify for the code behind this proxy (this watch asks Sourcify only; an explorer of the chain may hold one). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-13; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# getRoleMember(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, 0) on the contract (AccessControl, enumerable): the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x14b107cf534239c59571b066cb6497a321da897c","data":"0x9010d07c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"},"0x55508a0"]}'
# getMinDelay() on the holder (OpenZeppelin TimelockController), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x0da180b14721ce46a83669b4816cb652caa1001d","data":"0xf27a0c92"},"latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.mainnet.chain.robinhood.com -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x14b107cf534239c59571b066cb6497a321da897c","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 89458462 and 89458848 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.testnet.chain.robinhood.com/rpc -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9BF45734D09bC7CA39238e767B2af9AAc62a7f52","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000014b107cf534239c59571b066cb6497a321da897c"},"latest"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (31 = 0x1f); the 7th is the push timestamp. This RPC cannot replay the block of the build (it ignores the block tag, or no longer serves old state), so the value is the current one: compare the composite and the push timestamp with this page.