Telos Consilium TelosC Surge · authority risk 30/100, weak

Can one person move the money in Telos Consilium TelosC Surge on Plasma? The authority score is 30 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.

In short. One 2-of-5 Gnosis Safe is both owner and curator of this ~$100M USDT0 EulerEarn vault, no guardian is set, and the owner address also passes every curator, allocator and guardian check. Its owner-only calls (setCurator, setIsAllocator, setFee, setFeeRecipient) take effect immediately, outside the vault’s 1-day timelock.

Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.

Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build

The five readings

admin key40
multisig45
timelock0
price feed34
shared control100

Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.

To move the money: 2 keys, 24 h to react, about $50M behind one key.

Why this score

One 2-of-5 Gnosis Safe is both owner and curator of this ~$100M USDT0 EulerEarn vault, no guardian is set, and the owner address also passes every curator, allocator and guardian check. Its owner-only calls (setCurator, setIsAllocator, setFee, setFeeRecipient) take effect immediately, outside the vault’s 1-day timelock.

~$100M USDT0, owner = curator, no guardian

In the euler-earn source the 1-day delay covers only raising a market’s supply cap, removing a market, lowering the timelock and replacing an existing guardian, so timelockScore is 0: this project scores the gap, not the mere presence of a delay. crossExposureScore of 100 means no overlap was found among the addresses this repository names (an address search, not a full cross-chain comparison).

1 of 6 requirements met

Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.

If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 30 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 40 to 65, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Admin power is not a bare key (one key, or a tiny group, can change it).

Show this score in your README
[![authority risk: Telos Consilium TelosC Surge](https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=https%3A%2F%2Fraw.githubusercontent.com%2FRealSpap%2Fauthority-risk-oracle-showcase%2Fwatch-data%2Fbadge%2Fplasma%2F0xa9c251f8304b1b3fc2b9e8fcae78d94eff82ac66.json)](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/plasma-0xa9c251f8304b1b3fc2b9e8fcae78d94eff82ac66.html)

A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.

Money behind it: $138k (DefiLlama), of which $96k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).

Contract: 0xa9c251f8304b1b3fc2b9e8fcae78d94eff82ac66 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0xa9c251f8304b1b3fc2b9e8fcae78d94eff82ac66) on the Plasma oracle, listed in the repository.

Read at block 36260964, methodology 0x026c7c3b27bb926e…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.

Other hands: curator() is a Safe 2-of-5 (0x7d07…dcd8). A role is named by its getter, what it can do depends on the protocol (in a MetaMorpho vault guardian() can revoke a pending change, it does not move funds). A change is an alert.

Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0x7d07…dcd8 has executed 186 transactions (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.

Read live: admin: Safe 2-of-5 of 5 plain keys; delay: 24 h the contract enforces itself.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 2-of-5 0x7d07…dcd…dcd8 via owner(), disagrees with the published score: the timelock score says no delay (0), the contract enforces its own timelock of 24 h (timelock()). Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 2 keys move this contract, 24 h to react, $50M behind each key ($100M of USDT0 held by this contract, totalAssets() read live). The contract enforces its own timelock of 24 h (timelock()). 2 keys collude to act; 4 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 5 plain keys. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)

Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.

Reproduce the independent read yourself (5 public RPC calls, no key)
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xa9c251f8304b1b3fc2b9e8fcae78d94eff82ac66","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x21856af"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'

Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 35149475 and 35149487 of the chain

Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).

Reproduce this read yourself (block 36260964, public RPC, no key)
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d0000000000000000000000000a9c251f8304b1b3fc2b9e8fcae78d94eff82ac66"},"0x2294c64"]}'

The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (30 = 0x1e); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.