Can one person move the money in Euler V2 AccessControlEmergencyGovernor on Plasma? The authority score is 68 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. The same Governor → Timelock → Safe shape as the factory above, but for per-vault risk parameters, with a real 2-day delay, genuinely not instant despite the "Emergency" name.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 68 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 80 |
| timelock | 55 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys not read, 48 h to react.
The same Governor → Timelock → Safe shape as the factory above, but for per-vault risk parameters, with a real 2-day delay, genuinely not instant despite the "Emergency" name.
cross-exposure: 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20), same DAO Safe as the factory
Not confirmed this pass: which, if any, of the 156 deployed vaults actually point their own governor() at this specific address (a vault’s creator chooses at deploy time). Scored on the mechanism’s own confirmed-live strength, not on unconfirmed reach. Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20: the DAO Safe that proposes on this governor’s timelock is the same 4-of-8 Safe as the factory’s, whose 8 signers are identical to Euler’s DAO Safe on Monad, so crossExposureScore is folded to a flat 80 (admin, multisig and timelock unchanged).
Exit window: a delay with a bounded bypass, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 56.00% (score 68). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 68 to 98, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/plasma-0x9b3ceb22cab2f1b9ace4cd3132c8a123552eda2c.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $2M (DefiLlama), of which $634k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x9b3ceb22cab2f1b9ace4cd3132c8a123552eda2c on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x9b3ceb22cab2f1b9ace4cd3132c8a123552eda2c) on the Plasma oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 36260964, methodology 0x026c7c3b27bb926e…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 48 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 172800s delay 0x61d942d4…1921 via DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member 1 of 1 (AccessControl), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# getRoleMember(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, 0) on the contract (AccessControl, enumerable): the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x9b3ceb22cab2f1b9ace4cd3132c8a123552eda2c","data":"0x9010d07c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"},"0x21856af"]}'
# getMinDelay() on the holder (OpenZeppelin TimelockController), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x61d942d4809482e6f761a326471053b343ee1921","data":"0xf27a0c92"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 35149475 and 35149487 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000009b3ceb22cab2f1b9ace4cd3132c8a123552eda2c"},"0x2294c64"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (68 = 0x44); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.