Can one person move the money in Plasma L1 validator-set authority (Aquila) on Plasma? The authority score is 35 / 100 (weak): a small group with little delay.
In short. The chain-level baseline every other target here inherits. A real 3-of-4 Safe, no timelock - and per Plasma’s own client config, may not even be the mechanism actually gating consensus yet.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 50 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 50 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: 3 keys, 0 h to react, about $186M behind one key.
The chain-level baseline every other target here inherits. A real 3-of-4 Safe, no timelock - and per Plasma’s own client config, may not even be the mechanism actually gating consensus yet.
every target below inherits this
Not documented in Plasma’s own docs site (which states plainly the validator/committee mechanism is "under active development") - found instead in Plasma’s own GitHub org, PlasmaLaboratories/node-templates, a validator config file naming this exact contract. On-chain self-ID confirms it: a raw call returns the ASCII string "plasma-validator-set/v1". Its own config sets an activation_height for this contract that hadn’t been reached as of this scorer’s first pass - Plasma’s existing static validator list could still be what’s actually operative today, not this contract yet.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 35 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to moderate (40): admin key from 50 to 62, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is At least a 3-of-5 multisig (too few people need to agree).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/plasma-0x6c50b8ca8eeaa1c75dee5b5ea79772acabc92f48.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Money behind it: $557M (DefiLlama, the whole chain), of which $362M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x6c50b8ca8eeaa1c75dee5b5ea79772acabc92f48 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x6c50b8ca8eeaa1c75dee5b5ea79772acabc92f48) on the Plasma oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 36260964, methodology 0x026c7c3b27bb926e…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Admin Safe activity: the Safe 0xca6f…8f53 has executed 1 transaction (this watch has read that number since 2026-10-10; it has not seen it move). A Safe idle for 14 days or more that executes again, with money behind it, is an alert.
Read live: admin: Safe 3-of-4 of 4 plain keys; delay: none.
Independent read of the admin: a Safe 3-of-4 0xca6f…8f5…8f53 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. The attacker's question: 3 keys move this contract, no delay to react, $186M behind each key (the protocol's TVL, not this contract's balance). 3 keys collude to act; 2 keys lost and nobody can act. Signers: 4 plain keys. Implementation behind the proxy: 0xf70191daf77f1072a90466d7539d8c63f8b2bfcc (EIP-1967 implementation slot). No verified source on Sourcify for the code behind this proxy (this watch asks Sourcify only; an explorer of the chain may hold one). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x6c50b8ca8eeaa1c75dee5b5ea79772acabc92f48","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x21856af"]}'
# getThreshold() on the holder (a Safe)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xe75235b8"},"latest"]}'
# getOwners() on the holder: the signer set (word 2 is the count)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xa0e67e2b"},"latest"]}'
# getModulesPaginated(0x1, 50) on the holder: the modules (a module executes without the signatures)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<holder>","data":"0xcc2f845200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000032"},"latest"]}'
# the guard slot of the holder (keccak of guard_manager.guard.address)
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["<holder>","0x4a204f620c8c5ccdca3fd54d003badd85ba500436a431f0cbda4f558c93c34c8","latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x6c50b8ca8eeaa1c75dee5b5ea79772acabc92f48","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 35149475 and 35149487 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000006c50b8ca8eeaa1c75dee5b5ea79772acabc92f48"},"0x2294c64"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (35 = 0x23); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.