Can one person move the money in Yuzu Money yzUSD on Plasma? The authority score is 43 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. yzUSD, syzUSD and yzPP are proxies owned by a 2-day timelock (4-of-5 Safe), each token’s ADMIN_ROLE sits with a second timelock on a 12-hour delay (3-of-5 Safe, the same five bare-EOA signers), and that 3-of-5 Safe also holds an instant, uncapped pool-valuation seat on the yzPP first-loss pool with no delay in front of it.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 65 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 55 |
| timelock | 0 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 100 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys not read, 48 h to react.
yzUSD, syzUSD and yzPP are proxies owned by a 2-day timelock (4-of-5 Safe), each token’s ADMIN_ROLE sits with a second timelock on a 12-hour delay (3-of-5 Safe, the same five bare-EOA signers), and that 3-of-5 Safe also holds an instant, uncapped pool-valuation seat on the yzPP first-loss pool with no delay in front of it.
$61.5M TVL (DefiLlama), placeholder replaced: 55 to 43 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20)
Traced live on 2026-09-20 on two RPCs and adversarially re-verified, pushed on-chain the same day (Plasma testnet block 34083939). The old adminKey 20 was a placeholder built on a false negative: it tested the OpenZeppelin-4 TIMELOCK_ADMIN_ROLE hash on OpenZeppelin-5 timelocks, which administer through DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, and both timelocks are in fact their own only admin. Only the 2-day timelock (owner of every ProxyAdmin) can upgrade the logic. Through the 12-hour timelock the same keys can setTreasury (deposits are forwarded straight to a bare-EOA treasury), move fee and cap levers, and by granting roles mark NAV down and mint against nothing. The weakest path is the Safe’s direct POOL_MANAGER and DISTRIBUTOR seat on yzPP: updatePool can write the pool’s value in one batch, and four of the five signers use it weekly. Neither timelock has a bypass, but their only cancellers are the proposer Safe and one of its own signers, so the delay is a visibility window, not a veto. Scored 65/55/0 by the instant-Safe-seat convention (Radiant, Monad Aave). Pause seats, bounded EOA powers and the bare-EOA custody of the roughly $56M reserve are disclosed, not scored. The same five keys also own Safes on Ethereum and Monad, where Yuzu is not tracked. Full trace: data/finding_2026-09-20-yuzu-authority-trace.md.
Exit window: none: a change applies at once, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 43 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): timelock from 0 to 57, that is a confirmed delay before changes apply, every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/plasma-0x6695c0f8706c5ace3bdf8995073179cca47926dc.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $66M (DefiLlama), of which $38M sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x6695c0f8706c5ace3bdf8995073179cca47926dc on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x6695c0f8706c5ace3bdf8995073179cca47926dc) on the Plasma oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 36260964, methodology 0x026c7c3b27bb926e…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 48 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 172800s delay 0x21304575…cfbc via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(), disagrees with the published score: the timelock score says no delay (0), the live read finds a timelock of 48 h in the admin path via EIP-1967 admin -> ProxyAdmin owner(). Unchanged since 2026-10-10. Implementation behind the proxy: 0x8e02392855a51d9d5d18d71a7cfc731f56c68ea5 (EIP-1967 implementation slot). No verified source on Sourcify for the code behind this proxy (this watch asks Sourcify only; an explorer of the chain may hold one). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# the admin slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the word is the admin address
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x6695c0f8706c5ace3bdf8995073179cca47926dc","0xb53127684a568b3173ae13b9f8a6016e243e63b6e8ee1178d6a717850b5d6103","0x21856af"]}'
# owner() on the address the slot returned (a ProxyAdmin): the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"<address from the slot>","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x21856af"]}'
# getMinDelay() on the holder (OpenZeppelin TimelockController), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x2130457539612ae9838e0314cda1a8abbdb7cfbc","data":"0xf27a0c92"},"latest"]}'
# the implementation slot of the proxy (EIP-1967): the code behind it, an upgrade changes this word
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_getStorageAt","params":["0x6695c0f8706c5ace3bdf8995073179cca47926dc","0x360894a13ba1a3210667c828492db98dca3e2076cc3735a920a3ca505d382bbc","latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 35149475 and 35149487 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000006695c0f8706c5ace3bdf8995073179cca47926dc"},"0x2294c64"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (43 = 0x2b); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.