Can one person move the money in Ethena USDe OFT on Plasma? The authority score is 57 / 100 (moderate): a multisig without a real delay, the band where Bybit, WazirX and Radiant sat when they were drained.
In short. A real 5-of-10 Safe - and the same 10 signers, as an exact set, already control Ethereum L1’s own tracked Ethena Safe. A real delay is queued (Ownable2Step pending) but not active yet.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 55 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 100 |
| timelock | 15 |
| price feed | 100 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys not read, 24 h to react.
A real 5-of-10 Safe - and the same 10 signers, as an exact set, already control Ethereum L1’s own tracked Ethena Safe. A real delay is queued (Ownable2Step pending) but not active yet.
cross-exposure: 80 - same 10 signers as Ethereum L1
owner() is the current, active authority (the 5-of-10 Safe); pendingOwner() shows an in-progress transfer to a real TimelockController with a 1-day delay, on which that same Safe already holds every role - so even once accepted, authority doesn’t change hands, just gets a delay. Scored on the CURRENT state (no delay in effect), not the pending one.
Exit window: a delay with a bypass, or one not ruled out, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 0 (score 57 is under MIN_SAFE_SCORE 60). Cheapest path to decent (60): admin key from 55 to 63, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is A confirmed delay before changes apply, no bypass (changes can apply with no waiting time).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/plasma-0x5d3a1ff2b6bab83b63cd9ad0787074081a52ef34.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: how many keys it takes to move it; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $4.7B (DefiLlama, all chains), of which $2.0B sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x5d3a1ff2b6bab83b63cd9ad0787074081a52ef34 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x5d3a1ff2b6bab83b63cd9ad0787074081a52ef34) on the Plasma oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 36260964, methodology 0x026c7c3b27bb926e…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Read live: admin: a timelock; delay: 24 h on the timelock.
Independent read of the admin: a timelock, 86400s delay 0xabd3645b…5072 via owner(), consistent with the published admin-key score. Unchanged since 2026-10-10. (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
# owner() on the contract: the holder
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x5d3a1ff2b6bab83b63cd9ad0787074081a52ef34","data":"0x8da5cb5b"},"0x21856af"]}'
# getMinDelay() on the holder (OpenZeppelin TimelockController), in seconds
curl -s -X POST https://rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0xabd3645ba0bb60c238bede64378826e1206f5072","data":"0xf27a0c92"},"latest"]}'Each answer is a 32-byte word (an address sits in its last 20 bytes); the admin path is the one scripts/second_opinion.py reports for this contract. read between blocks 35149475 and 35149487 of the chain
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d00000000000000000000000005d3a1ff2b6bab83b63cd9ad0787074081a52ef34"},"0x2294c64"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (57 = 0x39); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.