Can one person move the money in Euler V2 eVaultFactory on Plasma? The authority score is 72 / 100 (decent): a multisig and a delay, with gaps.
In short. A fully-traced chain: Governor → a real 4-day Timelock → a 4-of-8 DAO Safe, with a separate 2-of-3 securityCouncil able to cancel. Despite Euler’s own “DAO” naming, this is Safe-and-Timelock-gated, not a token-vote DAO.
Exposure, not intent. The score counts what the keys could do, not what their holders will do, and says nothing about the odds of a loss. Re-read it yourself with a public RPC and curl: how.
Try a fix: drag the sliders Open the live dashboard re-read from the chain every 6 hours; this page is the snapshot of the build
| admin key | 70 |
|---|---|
| multisig | 80 |
| timelock | 68 |
| price feed | 2 |
| shared control | 80 |
Composite = 40% admin key + 30% multisig + 30% timelock, rounded. Price feed and shared control are read and shown, not folded in.
To move the money: keys and hours to react not read for this contract (never shown as zero).
A fully-traced chain: Governor → a real 4-day Timelock → a 4-of-8 DAO Safe, with a separate 2-of-3 securityCouncil able to cancel. Despite Euler’s own “DAO” naming, this is Safe-and-Timelock-gated, not a token-vote DAO.
best-governed target on this chain, cross-exposure: 80 (pushed on-chain 2026-09-20)
Pushed on-chain 2026-09-20: the DAO Safe’s 8 signers are identical, as an exact set, to the signers of Euler’s DAO Safe on Monad (a different Safe address per chain), so crossExposureScore is folded to a flat 80 against a dated 2026-09-19 snapshot of Monad’s DAO signers; admin, multisig and timelock are unchanged. 156 vaults deployed through this factory; at least one confirmed live to be retroactively upgradeable by this exact authority chain. A real, disclosed concentration: securityCouncil’s third signer is itself the separate "labs" Safe, and all 6 of labs’ own signers are a subset of the DAO Safe’s 8, so a smaller group of people sits behind more than one nominally-separate committee here. Not covered by the score: PAUSE_GUARDIAN_ROLE on the Governor is held by the Labs Safe and two bare EOAs, and either EOA alone can pause the factory (confirmed by eth_call simulation), an instant availability freeze that the timelock does not gate.
Exit window: a confirmed delay, bypass paths not all checked, the time a user has to leave after a harmful change is queued.
If a market used the example policy today (src/ExampleConsumer.sol: revert when stale, 0 under 60, 50% to 80% above): collateral factor 59.00% (score 72). Cheapest path to strong (80): admin key from 70 to 88, that is a stronger admin setup (admin power spread beyond one key, or checked by others), every other axis unchanged. This is the smallest step into the next band, not a fix for the weakness: the first requirement not met is Bypass paths of the delay checked and ruled out (the waiting time may be skipped).
[](https://realspap.github.io/oracle/p/plasma-0x42388213c6f56d7e1477632b58ae6bba9adeeea3.html)
A live badge: the score is read from the published watch files every time the page that shows it loads. Change nothing but your own repository.
Not assessed for this contract: who holds the admin power: the independent reader could not classify the holder; how many keys it takes to move it; the time anyone has to react; the money behind one key (no money figure, or no key count).
Money behind it: $2M (DefiLlama), of which $555k sits exposed to this setup (TVL × (100 − score) / 100, a weight, not a prediction).
Contract: 0x42388213c6f56d7e1477632b58ae6bba9adeeea3 on the explorer ↗. Score pushed on-chain on 2026-10-12; stale on the oracle when older than 9 days (the watch re-reads it anyway). Read the score yourself: getScore(0x42388213c6f56d7e1477632b58ae6bba9adeeea3) on the Plasma oracle, listed in the repository.
Read at block 36260964, methodology 0x026c7c3b27bb926e…. The score reads the authority path (keys, multisigs, timelocks, roles, price feeds); it does not audit the code for bugs, and it measures exposure, not the chance of being hit (see the backtest in the repository). Dispute this score with evidence, or read this page as JSON.
Independent read of the admin: not possible here (no admin slot, owner(), admin(), DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE member or authority() answered). (scripts/second_opinion.py: a reader that shares nothing with the scorer, re-run every 6 hours)
Score unchanged since its publication on 2026-10-12; every later move will be a line of the hash-chained log. Methodology changed on 2026-10-13: points before that date come from another method and are not comparable.
Follow this contract: Atom feed of its score moves, alerts and queued operations (nothing else).
curl -s -X POST https://testnet-rpc.plasma.to -H 'content-type: application/json' -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_call","params":[{"to":"0x50840a7667baEa9D05ad4ae3dCeb384724b58720","data":"0xd47875d000000000000000000000000042388213c6f56d7e1477632b58ae6bba9adeeea3"},"0x2294c64"]}'The 6th 32-byte word of the answer is the composite score (72 = 0x48); the 7th is the push timestamp. Same call with "latest" instead of the block gives the current value.